The latest episodes in Taiwan-South Africa relations have unfolded into an unusual chapter in Taipei’s bilateral outreach to a country that is closely allied with China. On Tuesday last week Taiwan announced that it would impose export controls on 47 products, including semiconductors, shipped to South Africa, but suspended the restrictions two days later. The designated products were supposed to be required for preapprovals.
The export measures were originally instituted as a countermeasure to South Africa’s continuous downgrading and renaming of Taiwan’s representative offices from the “Taipei Commercial Office in Johannesburg” to the “Taipei Commercial Office in Cape Town” and relocating the office from the country’s capital of Pretoria to Johannesburg, a shift seen as weakening Taiwan’s sovereignty. To this, Taiwan’s International Trade Administration responded: “The South African government’s actions have undermined our national and public security. We are adopting measures to restrict trade to maintain our sovereignty.”
Though short-lived, the action and its response should be understood within a broader geopolitical context.
The export controls introduced as a countermeasure have to be read in the context of Taiwan’s US$4 million of semiconductor-related goods shipped to South Africa last year. However, the restrictions were suspended after two days, as Pretoria requested diplomatic discussions, symbolizing the leverage Taiwan holds through its semiconductors.
Taiwan’s centrality in cutting-edge chips has been described as a “silicon shield,” a deterrent against Chinese aggression. Taiwan is home to 90 percent of the world’s advanced semiconductors, and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co is a critical link in the global chip supply chain.
This recent episode highlights a larger question: Can Taiwan deploy its semiconductor dominance as a strategic lever against China on the world stage? Yes, but it is bounded by practical limits. The potential to use the chip card against a country could have more implications. The South Africa case signifies Taiwan’s ability to frame semiconductors as a diplomatic shield in disputes with smaller countries. That Pretoria requested negotiation is already a win
This is significant as Taiwan is home to the vast majority of advanced semiconductor production in the world.
Similarly, such a measure could also destabilize the semiconductor supply chain ecosystem. The China factor and the possible forms of retaliation could be another factor that might impinge on Taiwan’s chip diplomacy on the global stage.
However, with limited diplomatic options, Taiwan was able to bring South Africa to the negotiating table through calibrated export controls. It is therefore imperative that Taiwan use its chip dominance judiciously, pursuing diplomatic goals with caution and pragmatism. A thorough analysis of the future of chip-access-induced negotiations should be a priority for policymakers.
Amina Reem VP is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan fellow and visiting scholar at National Chengchi University.
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