President William Lai (賴清德) has been handed a trifecta of setbacks in recent months. Taiwan’s trade negotiations with the United States proved inconclusive. Lai was not permitted to transit New York City as part of a broader trip. And the Democratic Progressive Party failed in its attempts to recall Kuomintang legislators. On top of this, there is concern in Taiwan that a meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping (習近平) this fall could generate disadvantageous outcomes for Taiwan, such as revisions to America’s longstanding cross-Strait policies to more closely align with Beijing’s preferred framing of issues.
These are challenging times for Taiwan’s leaders. Nevertheless, Taiwan retains significant agency to shape its own future and its relations with the United States. To do so effectively, though, it may need to accept several uncomfortable truths.
First, Taiwan’s leaders need to internalize that Mainland Affairs Council Minister Chiu Chui-cheng’s (邱垂正) September 12 public speech in Washington missed the mark. Chiu made several important points in his presentation. He effectively outlined the holistic nature of the threat that China poses to Taiwan. He usefully highlighted the critical role that Taiwan plays for America’s and the world’s technological advancement. He also did a good job pressing Beijing to match words with deeds. Chiu persuasively argued that if Beijing wants to be seen abroad as a champion of peace and dialogue, then it should begin by engaging directly with leaders in Taipei to address shared cross-Strait challenges such as transnational crime, pandemic prevention, and responding to extreme climate events.
Where Chiu fell short, though, was in not recognizing the changed policy landscape in Washington. Trump and his team are not swayed by arguments about democracies versus autocracies or about upholding a rules-based international order. With the world’s two other hotspots (Ukraine and the Middle East) engulfed in violence, the Trump team is counting on Taipei to pragmatically and responsibly uphold peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. They are not interested in public warnings about Taiwan kicking off a “domino effect” that could endanger the United States homeland.
The “domino theory” is the widely discredited argument used to justify America’s entry into the Vietnam war, an inglorious chapter in American history. The Vietnam war provides a case study of the type of strategic scaremongering that produced an American military defeat that Trump abhors and has vowed never to repeat. It was shortsighted for Chiu to associate Taiwan with the logic that led America into a bloody quagmire.
Trump is not interested in dominos. He clearly wishes to keep America out of war with China and has pledged to the American people that he will do so. Against this backdrop, Taiwan’s leaders risk exposing their misalignment with the Trump administration if they continue to try to stoke discussions in the United States about prospects for major power war. Those debates are best left to American politicians and commentators.
Fairly or not, if Taiwan’s leaders want to generate positive energy for Taiwan in Washington these days, they will need to spend less time trying to scare Americans and more time presenting Taiwan as an indispensable actor for advancing America’s national goals.
The most significant benchmark for Taiwan is the conclusion of a trade deal. Some officials and experts in Taipei believe the Trump administration will be reluctant to close out a US-Taiwan trade deal until after he meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping. According to this logic, Trump will not want to make waves by finalizing a trade deal with Taiwan while he simultaneously is negotiating with Beijing. Taipei, therefore, should be patient, withhold further concessions, and wait until the time is ripe to finalize negotiations.
Members of the Trump administration are hoping for the opposite from Taipei. They would like Taiwan’s trade negotiators to show urgency and seriousness in closing out a new deal now, rather than shelving negotiations, losing momentum, and letting issues fester. America’s deals with Japan and South Korea provide a point of comparison. In both cases, Japanese and South Korean leaders took political risks to compromise on market access, in addition to making major announcements of new investments in the United States.
For example, Japan showed flexibility in increasing its rice import quota, and South Korea took the hard step of expanding access for American beef, pork, and grains. In terms of investments, Japan pledged US$550 billion in strategic sectors, while South Korea said it would invest US$350 billion in US assets and infrastructure, though the delivery of South Korean investments could be imperiled by America’s dumb immigration raid against a major South Korean battery plant in Georgia. Taiwan’s recent announcement that it will purchase US$10 billion in US agricultural products over the next four years in line with its own market demand was a smart and timely move.
Additionally, American officials also seem eager to see Taiwan move forward with plans to put money behind purchases of new asymmetric defense capabilities, such as drones, missiles, and sensors. Trump reportedly is not interested in transferring armaments through his presidential drawdown authority, as the previous administration did. He wants Taiwan to pay for its own security. Trump’s team understands that Taiwan’s politics are complicated, but they are not terribly sympathetic on this point. They feel urgency to bolster deterrence against China and believe Taiwan should as well.
None of this may feel fair. It certainly is different. The Trump administration does not view alliances and partnerships as unquestionably good things, as the Biden administration did. They do not look at the world as a contest between democracies versus autocracies. They do not take an enlightened long-term view toward building goodwill and fostering shared agendas for deepening partnerships. They pride themselves as hard-nosed dealmakers.
Taiwan’s elected leaders know best how to define and advance Taiwan’s interests. If they decide that Taiwan’s interests are served by strengthening relations with the United States, they may need to recalibrate their approach to align more closely with America’s current orientation and priorities.
Ryan Hass is a senior fellow, the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and the Director of the China Center at the Brookings Institution.
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