Lockheed Martin on Tuesday responded to concerns over delayed shipments of F-16V Block 70 jets, saying it had added extra shifts on its production lines to accelerate progress.
The Ministry of National Defense on Monday said that delivery of all 66 F-16V Block 70 jets — originally expected by the end of next year — would be pushed back due to production line relocations and global supply chain disruptions.
Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo (顧立雄) said that Taiwan and the US are working to resolve the delays, adding that 50 of the aircraft are in production, with 10 scheduled for flight testing this year and delivery next year.
The F-16V represents a major leap in Taiwan’s air defense capability. It is equipped with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar capable of detecting stealth and long-range threats; an upgraded mission computer for faster and more reliable decisionmaking; compatibility with advanced weapons such as AIM-9X, AMRAAM and Harpoon missiles; and modern countermeasures that improve survivability against surface-to-air missiles. The jets feature a Link 16 secure communications system, enabling real-time networking with modern US aircraft, including the F-35.
Before the US approved the sale of the new aircraft, Lockheed Martin in 2016 and 2017 sent upgrade kits for Taiwan’s older F-16A/Bs. Aerospace Industrial Development Corp (AIDC) completed the upgrades last year, converting the jets to F-16V standard.
The success of the upgrade program shows that Taiwan’s aerospace sector has the capacity to handle complex defense projects. AIDC handled the installation of Lockheed Martin’s upgrade kits, while the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology installed the radar, avionics and engines. The institutions have proven that they can sustain advanced systems; the next step is to manufacture more of them.
Taiwan should seek a greater role in the F-16V supply chain. With US approval, the institute could produce non-classified components domestically — radar parts, avionics modules and weapons interfaces — and perhaps even assemble airframes, much as South Korea-based Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) does for its KF-16 jets. KAI and Japan-based Mitsubishi Heavy Industries have benefited from licensed codevelopment of fighters with Lockheed Martin, which boosted their industrial bases, enabling Japan to pursue its F-X stealth plane and South Korea to develop its KF-21 Boramae.
Taiwan, facing far greater strategic pressure, cannot afford to lag behind in such capabilities. While the institute and AIDC have not announced plans to develop a new crewed fighter, both are investing in uncrewed systems that could one day complement — or even replace — piloted aircraft. The AIDC T-5 Brave Eagle advanced jet trainer could be adapted for light combat duties with the addition of AESA radar and modern avionics. Such hybrid solutions could expand Taiwan’s operational flexibility while reducing costs.
Air superiority alone would not decide a conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s defense strategy must emphasize anti-access and area denial, combining drones, missiles and mobile launchers to deter or delay invasion until allied support arrives. That approach depends on technologies such as radar, electronic warfare and secure data links — all of which are integral to the F-16V program.
Delays in deliveries are regrettable, but they underscore the urgency of building greater self-reliance. Taiwan must not only buy aircraft; it must learn to build, maintain and innovate around them.
By deepening domestic participation in the F-16V program and expanding technological expertise, Taiwan can ensure that its air power is not only modern, but sustainable. Sovereignty in defense begins with sovereignty in production.
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