Over the past decade, Taiwan and its vibrant civil society have excelled in public diplomacy. Campaigns such as “Taiwan Can Help” and “Chip in with Taiwan,” as well as Ministry of Foreign Affairs fellowships, international youth ambassador exchange programs, international forums hosted in Taiwan, visits by foreign delegations and influencers, and sporting and cultural events have brought Taiwan closer to the rest of the world.
Still, the successes have focused mainly on branding: selling Taiwan’s culture, openness and innovation to global audiences. They must continue, but they are no longer enough. The other core mission of public diplomacy — ie, policy advocacy and strategic narrative building — has fallen behind. On this front, Taiwan needs to step up.
Much of Taiwan’s policy-related outreach is top-down and Taiwan-centered. The bulk of advocacy work is done by diplomats and representative offices through traditional and new media, with events organized at academic institutions or think tanks. Those efforts matter, especially for alliance-building, but they largely reach sympathetic audiences. It seems that, too often, Taiwan ends up preaching to the choir.
The imbalance is especially clear in the fight against disinformation. Taiwan has poured significant resources into countering Chinese propaganda at home. By contrast, far less is being done to challenge the narratives in the international arena.
Meanwhile, Beijing is stepping up its narrative offensive abroad, branding Taiwan’s ruling party as “Nazis” and mischaracterizing World War II–era documents, while most of Taiwan’s counter-efforts remain focused at home. What is missing is scale, coordination and a true outward-facing civilian network capable of sustained advocacy abroad.
Israel offers a useful comparison. Hasbara (“explanation” in Hebrew) refers to Israel’s broad efforts to explain and defend its policies abroad. Whatever one thinks of its policies, Israel has built an infrastructure to mobilize Israeli and Jewish communities worldwide. Non-governmental organizations such as StandWithUs and programs like the Hasbara Fellowships train people on campuses and online, equipping them to engage skeptics, host debates and push back against hostile narratives.
Taiwan has no equivalent, yet it could be argued that it faces a far friendlier environment. Few people are inclined to attack its narrative. However, without a prepared network of credible, civilian messengers abroad, that advantage might be squandered.
Conflict over Taiwan’s future will not be confined to the Taiwan Strait. It will also be fought in classrooms, newsrooms and social media feeds. If Taiwan waits until a crisis to build its capacity in those arenas, it will be too late. Once tensions escalate, Beijing’s propaganda machine will go into overdrive and catching up will be much harder.
Taiwan must invest in strategic narrative building and policy advocacy. That means empowering grassroots actors abroad, supporting their initiatives and encouraging Taiwanese to confidently engage in debate.
Far from being a liability, such confrontational engagement can expose the weaknesses in Beijing’s claims and highlight Taiwan’s democratic values.
Taiwan’s story resonates worldwide, but stories do not tell themselves and narratives left uncontested are quickly filled by others. For Taiwan’s public diplomacy to work, Taiwanese at home and abroad must recognize that they have agency and a role to play. The government can help and facilitate, but it cannot substitute for committed people willing to speak up, organize and engage skeptical audiences.
It is this grassroots energy, supported but not directed from above, that will give Taiwan the credibility and resilience it needs in the narrative battle.
Mor Sobol is an associate professor in Tamkang University’s Department of Diplomacy and International Relations.
KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) recent visit to Beijing and her upcoming visit to Washington will serve as a high-level test of her diplomatic mettle. In Beijing, Cheng was received with symbolic gestures, a warm reception, and high-level access. In Washington, she will receive far less pomp and far sharper questions about the KMT’s vision for the future of Taiwan. Her challenge will be to persuade Washington that the KMT’s engagement with China can coexist with strong deterrence. Cheng’s April 7-12 visit to mainland China coincided with an intense period of conflict in Iran. Despite the strategic significance of Cheng’s trip,
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has sent the vast Asian chemicals industry into a tailspin. Deprived of the likes of Qatari natural gas and Saudi Arabian oil, the region’s fertilizer and plastics plants are slowing production or even shutting down. Everywhere except China, that is. In petrochemicals, China is unique. As well as a traditional industry that uses oil and gas as feedstock, it has parallel output that relies on its abundant domestic coal. Unsurprisingly, India and other regional powers want to copy and paste the Chinese method. This would not be easy — or climate friendly. The
US President Donald Trump recently repeated his claim that “Taiwan stole America’s chip industry,” reigniting public debate on the issue. As a former Taiwanese minister of economic affairs and an entrepreneur deeply involved in semiconductor supply chain development, I feel a responsibility to clarify this misunderstanding. From the perspective of global industrial evolution and the economic principle of comparative advantage, such a statement appears overly simplistic and risks obscuring the essence of the issue. The rise of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry was not built on “replacing America,” but rather emerged as a result of countries pursuing different development paths within the
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto says he knows how to fix the problems facing Indonesia. Yet his economic mismanagement and authoritarian tendencies are steering the nation toward a familiar mix of currency instability and political chaos. The world’s fourth-most populous nation risks reversing the hard-won democratic and business reforms that came after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. At that time, the rupiah collapsed and the political upheaval that followed forced former president Haji Mohamed Suharto from power. Prabowo’s administration is ignoring similar warning signs. That disconnect was apparent in a national address on Wednesday, when Prabowo projected the swagger that has