The attendance of more than 100,000 people at a London rally called by the far-right agitator Tommy Robinson underlines the urgency for the UK’s Labour government to demonstrate progress in bringing immigration under control. The danger is that blunt measures designed to show toughness would cause collateral damage — not only in humanitarian terms, but to Britain’s wider economic and strategic interests. That risk applies particularly to migrants from Hong Kong.
In May, the British government released a policy paper that proposed doubling the standard qualifying period for settlement to 10 years. Typically, visa holders can apply for citizenship one year after gaining “indefinite leave to remain” — permanent residency — status; so the current six-year pathway would lengthen to 11 years. Officials have not clarified whether the proposed changes, which are subject to a forthcoming consultation, would apply to Hong Kong migrants arriving under the British National Overseas (BNO) visa program. That uncertainty is causing considerable anxiety among the more than 160,000 people who have moved to the UK from the former British-administered territory via the BNO visa route since 2021.
Net migration to Britain peaked at 906,000 in the year through June 2023, inflated by one-time events such as the Ukraine invasion and post-Brexit rules that swelled arrivals from non-EU nations. The number more than halved to 431,000 last year, but a surge in small boat crossings under Labour — which amount to a small fraction of the legal immigration numbers — has stirred public anger and driven Nigel Farage’s anti-immigration Reform UK to a wide lead in opinion polls. The broad aims of the immigration paper are to bring down net migration, make it harder to stay in the country and tilt the incoming balance toward higher-skilled workers who are of more benefit to the economy.
“British nationality is a privilege, not a right,” the paper states. That is not wrong; it is just beside the point where Hong Kongers are concerned. BNO passport holders are already British nationals. The clue is in the name.
The BNO visa scheme was not a regular immigration route — it represented the historic fulfillment of a moral obligation. The program, proposed by the Conservative government of former British prime minister Boris Johnson and enacted with cross-party support, was a bespoke response to China’s 2020 imposition of a national security law that dismantled many of Hong Kong’s freedoms. The BNO passport existed precisely because of this risk, having been created in the 1980s in preparation for the 1997 handover to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of a territory that Britain had ruled for 156 years. The passport, unique to Hong Kong, did not confer the right of abode in the UK, but at least offered a form of insurance policy — one that matured in 2020.
Migrants from the territory did not turn up in Britain uninvited; they were encouraged to go there. And they were promised a five-years-plus-one route to citizenship. To renege on the deal would undo this honorable act. You do not need to be steeped in legal or constitutional principles to appreciate the unfairness of what is being proposed. “Moving the goalposts” is how it is known in the vernacular — a phrase that appeared 10 times in last week’s British parliamentary debate on the issue.
That is the moral case. Lumping the BNO visa program with other immigration routes is also financially and culturally self-destructive. BNO visa holders are better educated than the average Briton, with 69 percent having a degree or higher qualification, and a high proportion are professionals. Many who were in managerial positions or ran businesses in Hong Kong are doing jobs in the UK that are far below their skill set (this writer, who lived in Hong Kong for 25 years, knows several in this situation). They are here because they value their freedom, and they are a resource for the British economy. Why would anyone want to make it harder for them to stay?
The tougher rules proposed in the immigration white paper are partly aimed at discouraging those who would be a drain on the state or would struggle to integrate. On both counts, these considerations are largely redundant for BNO visa holders. They grew up in a British system, in a city where English is an official language. The sovereign may have changed, but Hong Kong’s institutions and way of life remained largely intact until 2020. Hong Kong people are also famously self-reliant, adaptable and reluctant to take welfare (there is precious little of that in the city anyway).
Making BNO visa holders wait another five years would impose practical difficulties and financial hardships. Their children need indefinite leave to remain to qualify for home student university fees, without which they must pay much higher international rates. With China withdrawing recognition of the BNO passport as a valid document, they also need full British passports to be able to access their savings in Hong Kong’s pension system, the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF). Keeping the five-year pathway would result in a US$5.4 billion injection into the UK economy by the end of this parliament from migrants withdrawing their MPF savings, says the China Strategic Risks Institute, a think tank.
Finally, doubling the visa pathway to 10 years would damage the UK’s global reputation for integrity, dependability and fairness, and hand a propaganda coup to China, vindicating the CCP’s warnings that the British were not to be trusted and would treat Hong Kong residents as “second-class citizens.”
More than 50 members of the British parliament spoke in last week’s three-hour debate, many testifying to the contribution that Hong Kong constituents have made to their communities. The government’s response fell short, with British Minister of State for Border Security and Asylum Alex Norris saying that he would not prejudge the outcome of the consultation.
No consultation is needed. Hong Kong people sought refuge in Britain after China punished the city for standing up for values that were inculcated by its former colonial master. They are owed a debt of loyalty. Many exist under the threat of the CCP’s transnational repression; they do not need further reasons to fear the future. The British government should confirm that it would exempt BNO visa holders from its proposed changes. They should never have been included.
Matthew Brooker is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering business and infrastructure. Formerly, he was an editor for Bloomberg News and the South China Morning Post. This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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