Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba on Sunday announced that he would step down, citing a desire to avoid further divisions within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
However, he has been politically isolated ever since the party’s historic defeat in July’s parliamentary elections. One day prior to his resignation, Ishiba’s perceived mentor, former Japanese prime minister Yoshihide Suga, and Japanese Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Shinjiro Koizumi reportedly joined forces to persuade him to step down. That move, it seems, was the final straw.
The leading candidates to succeed Ishiba are Japanese Representative Sanae Takaichi and Koizumi. Takaichi is often viewed as an ideological heir to former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, advocating for constitutional revision, boosting national defense and demonstrating strong support for Taiwan. Her strengths lie in her ability to solidify the LDP’s “bedrock conservative base” and her close ties among US political circles.
However, given the male-dominated culture of Japan’s parliament, female politicians often face skepticism regarding their ability to coordinate.
Koizumi is the favorite among young people and the media for his photogenic and moderate image, but he lacks experience and policy depth. Although he initially stood out during last year’s contest for the party leadership, his poor debate performance ultimately led to him finishing third — prompting concerns that he might possess more charisma than competence.
Regardless of who emerges as Japan’s next prime minister, they will face three major challenges:
First is Japan’s economy.
The country is grappling with inflation and sluggish economic growth. Additionally, increases in defense spending combined with growing healthcare and pension costs have stretched public finances thin. The new Cabinet would struggle to regain public trust without strong and effective economic policies.
Takaichi plans to continue with Abe’s economic policies, widely known as Abenomics, advocating for a clear and consistent approach — expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. Koizumi, in contrast, has given relatively little attention to economic issues.
Second is intra-party and bipartisan coordination.
The LDP is deeply factionalized and frequent changes in leadership have further destabilized it. The slim majority of the ruling coalition has made navigating parliament increasingly difficult. Takaichi’s strong will and clear-cut conservative stance could help solidify the party’s base, but might hinder her ability to mediate and unify the factions. Koizumi, being much younger and more moderate, could offer greater flexibility in building a consensus — although his lack of experience would raise concerns about whether he could gain respect of senior party members. Ultimately, the ability to build trust within the party would be key to determining the new administration’s longevity.
Third is foreign affairs and national defense.
The international landscape is becoming increasingly volatile and the US-China rivalry is growing more intense. Ishiba attempted to strike a balance between the two powers, resulting in a massive loss of conservative voters. The next prime minister would need to deepen the US-Japan alliance and firmly stand on the side of democracy. Takaichi holds a clear advantage in this arena. She has access to the resources of the former Abe faction and is well-versed in US political affairs, while Koizumi notably lacks experience in foreign policy.
Takachi has ideals and international experience, but lacks the ability to mediate. Koizumi is popular and has a favorable image, but lacks real political strength. Japan’s political landscape requires a strong and decisive leader, but also hopes for a prime minister who can unite the LDP.
It might be difficult to find someone who embodies both.
With the weak ruling coalition and strong opposition of its post-Ishiba era, Japan seems to be entering another cycle of short-lived administrations.
The question is whether the leading role this time around would be played by a woman or a man.
Wang Hui-sheng is a founding member of the East Asian Research Institute.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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