The fire that broke out at the Hsinta Power Plant in Kaohsiung on Tuesday has once again brought Taiwan’s energy issues into the spotlight. Although there were fortunately no casualties, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chi-mai’s (陳其邁) response to the incident exposed a long-standing structural contradiction: While Kaohsiung has supplied a large portion of Taiwan’s electricity for many years, it simultaneously bears the brunt of pollution, industrial safety risks and environmental impacts.
While not without flaws, Chen’s line of questioning was not entirely unreasonable.
Transitioning from coal to gas is an international trend steering the direction of Taiwan’s energy transformation. Coal is an energy source with high carbon emissions and although natural gas is not an ideal solution, it could help reduce emissions and overall pollution. Kaohsiung hopes to move away from coal-fired power to ease the burden it has placed on local residents — a demand that appears to be reasonable and fit within the framework of environmental justice.
However, the path to energy transition is far longer and more complex than slogans suggest. Natural gas largely relies on imports — therefore the stability of its supply and price is heavily influenced by international market fluctuations. Moreover, liquefied natural gas terminals and gas transmission facilities often face environmental impact assessments and trigger local opposition.
Chen’s assertion that each regions in Taiwan should be responsible for producing the electricity it consumes is more of a lofty ideal than a practical policy. The reality is that, while northern Taiwan has massive electricity demand, its high population density and limited available land make it difficult to find suitable sites for new power plants — not to mention strong resistance from local residents.
Taiwan’s power grid is designed for nationwide distribution, so it is not feasible to say that power should be generated where it is used.
This contradiction is not unique to Taiwan, but a global phenomenon. During its own energy transition, Germany also faced opposition to transmitting electricity produced in the north to the south, and worked vigorously to develop decentralized renewable energy systems.
That being said, Taiwan’s conditions differ from that of Germany. The plausibility of rooftop solar panels is limited by factors such as typhoons and urban infrastructure, while onshore wind farms face the challenges of limited land and local resistance.
Relying solely on weather-dependent renewables is not enough to support industrial and everyday energy needs. For Taiwan, a more viable direction would be to combine the use of small-scale gas-fired units, renewable energy and energy storage systems to gradually develop regional microgrids — a more decentralized and resilient approach that could ease the burden on southern Taiwan while reducing the power grid’s dependence on single large power plants.
Chen’s appeal not only reflects the long held grievances of Kaohsiung residents, but also highlights the daunting challenges of Taiwan’s energy transition.
The nation needs more than rhetoric about energy alternatives — it needs forward-looking planning and a more pragmatic nationwide consensus.
Only by reshaping the energy landscape based on the principles of fairness and resilience can Taiwan avoid repeating the mistake of forcing a single region to bear excessive risks.
Such measures are essential for the nation to maintain its footing amid worldwide decarbonization efforts and surging industrial competition.
Dino Wei is an engineer.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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