If you want a glimpse of a changing global order, go to Singapore. That was what I did last month, when I served as the S. Rajaratnam professor of strategic studies at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies and met extensively with leading thinkers and government officials.
Singapore is a mind-blowing success story that reminds the world how distinctive the US’ post-World War II global project was — and how much uncertainty today’s more unilateral and abrasive superpower is creating for smaller states.
Singapore gained its independence unwillingly in 1965, after being booted from the larger Malaysian Federation. It was immediately at risk of being engulfed by radicalism convulsing the region. However, it went on to become a hub of trade and technology with living standards among the highest in the world. Its small, but tough military, and strategy-minded elite, have helped Singapore punch above its global weight. The island has become a model for other nations that aspire to be “the Singapore of” somewhere — small states that somehow make it big.
Illustration: Yusha
The country’s rise reflected potent advantages: its strategic location, near the Strait of Malacca, at the confluence of the Pacific and Indian oceans; the stability of its governance, rooted in a unique blend of Eastern and Western traditions; and the visionary leadership of founding prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew (李光耀). However, the country’s leaders also recognize that Singapore might not have survived, let alone thrived, absent a global system led by the US.
Lee long argued that the US’ war in Vietnam was a bloody success: By holding the line for a decade, the US bought crucial time for Singapore and its neighbors to stabilize themselves economically and politically. More broadly, the US secured the seas, discouraged violent aggression, underwrote free trade and globalization, and provided public goods that a micro-state could hardly have secured alone.
When the Pentagon lost access to air and naval bases in the Philippines in the 1990s, Singapore quietly welcomed US forces. A close security partnership with Washington remains a cornerstone of its foreign policy and a counterweight to Chinese power.
That balancing act is tricky, given that Singapore has an ethnic Chinese majority and Beijing is its largest trade partner: When I visited, I saw plenty of electric vehicles made by BYD. Changes in US policy are not making things any simpler.
Singapore has been buffeted by US President Donald Trump’s tariffs — applied even though the US has a trade surplus with Singapore — and threats to seize territory from weaker countries. Many Singaporean observers are bemused by a US president who talks about making America great again, but attacks its university ecosystem, the capacity of its governing institutions, its system of checks and balances, and other pillars of US strength.
In April, then-Singaporean minister for defence Ng Eng Hen (黃永宏) said that the US had shifted from being a system manager to acting like “a landlord seeking rent.” In his speech marking Singapore’s 60th birthday last month, Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong (黃循財) bluntly said that it is now “every country for itself.”
There is a consensus among Singaporean leaders that the age of a US-led international order is over. There is less certainty about what comes next.
One relatively favorable possibility is that a more narrowly self-interested, transactional US would still compete with other big actors, thereby preserving some space for the world’s smaller states. An uglier scenario is an aggressively acquisitive US shredding international norms, such as the prohibition on territorial conquest, as well as the rules-based trading system that Singapore has banked on, and using its power for more nakedly exploitive ends. Or perhaps the US could simply turn inward, leaving the field to others, and unleashing conflict and nuclear proliferation across Asia. Regardless of the outcome, Singaporean leaders are preparing their population for a very different world.
The country is hardly helpless. A more transactional US would still want some partnership with Singapore, because the island has things — military access, help in securing pharmaceutical and semiconductor supply chains — that the US needs. Singapore is already a standout on military spending, allocating about 3 percent of GDP to defense.
The government is making a virtue of technological upheaval by integrating artificial intelligence (AI) into the workings of government and seeking to train one of the world’s most AI-literate workforces. Singapore is also doubling down on ties with neighbors: A special economic zone in Johor, Malaysia, would give Singapore-based multinationals access to Malaysian workers and space. However, short-term optimism about Singapore’s prospects is clouded by some larger, longer-term concerns.
Singapore is a case study in demographic degradation: Its total fertility rate has long been near the world’s lowest. Immigration helps, but also strains the social fabric. Given that many recent immigrants are Chinese, this poses geopolitical complications as well.
Not least, the world that enabled Singapore’s rise is passing, and what comes next might be less benign.
The Singapore story is remarkable, but in a shifting global landscape, the next chapter might be harder than the last.
Singapore thrived in a i>Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and Henry Kissinger distinguished professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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