In the aftermath of the recall votes on Saturday last week, international media headlines declared: “Voters in Taiwan reject bid to oust China-friendly lawmakers” (The Associated Press, July 26) and: “Attempt to unseat 24 ‘pro-China’ opposition politicians in Taiwan fails” (Guardian, July 26).
The dominant narrative is that voters embraced the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), despite its pro-China policies and orientation, with some interpreting it as a sign that society is becoming hesitant in its resistance to China’s aggression. However, most Taiwanese who voted against the mass recall denied that their decision was about China.
What could be made of this stark divergence in interpretation?
The recall movement began as a grassroots campaign spearheaded by civic groups alarmed by KMT lawmakers’ obstructionism and perceived leniency toward Beijing. However, as the movement gained momentum, the KMT reframed the movement as a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-backed assault on the opposition. The KMT shifted the narrative from “citizens vs lawmakers” to “the opposition vs the authoritarian ruling party.”
Many who opposed the recalls resonated with the KMT’s statements. They believed that the DPP’s China warnings were exaggerated. Many insisted that their vote was about “disciplining the ruling party” and “achieving a balance of power,” wanting the KMT-TPP bloc to retain its majority to counterbalance a perceived DPP monopoly of power.
The KMT’s reframing also used gestures such as a NT$10,000 universal cash handout. Although widely criticized as pork-barrel politics, it solidified loyalty among supporters.
To paraphrase sociologist Randall Collins, the actions formed a dense chain of interaction rituals that sustained strong emotional energy within the KMT’s base and even among segments of independent voters, ensuring high voter turnout and enthusiasm.
Meanwhile, the DPP hesitated to fully embrace the recall movement, fearing that overt involvement would validate the KMT’s “DPP oppression” narrative.
However, this left civic groups emotionally and organizationally vulnerable. To be sure, volunteers and activists demonstrated formidable resilience, dedication and creativity in their attempt to develop an inclusive narrative, portraying the recall as a fight for all Taiwanese against unqualified politicians. They also built important networks of committed volunteers. However, the recall effort demanded resources they lacked, so it was difficult to coordinate effective solidarity rituals to help expand the campaign’s “we-ness.”
Most international media coverage after the votes overlooked the “framing competition.” Having largely neglected the months-long civic campaign, the outlets defaulted to framing it as pro-China vs pro-independence.
Reports by Reuters and the Financial Times emphasized vote tallies and legislative balances (“Taiwan move to recall opposition lawmakers fails,” Reuters, July 26; “Taiwanese voters reject motion to recall opposition lawmakers,” Financial Times, July 27), while the South China Morning Post (SCMP) and Foreign Policy referenced political polarization (“Taiwan recall shock waves likely no matter who prevails at ballots, analysts say,” SCMP, July 25; “Taiwan’s recall elections and China’s shadow,” Foreign Policy, July 25). Yet none traced how narrative control shaped the recall’s outcome.
By interpreting the recalls as a referendum on China policy, international media might have overestimated voters’ policy-based rationality and overlooked how discontent toward ruling elites drives participation. In contrast, Taiwanese who rejected the recalls saw it as a domestic power-check, not a statement on cross-strait relations.
This disconnect underscores the KMT’s framing success. It should prompt the DPP to reflect on its utterly ineffective messaging. It might encourage civic groups to reimagine how to enact solidarity rituals. It also invites Taiwanese to recognize that, in the eyes of the world, their votes are never not about China. It challenges international journalists to document how local politicians construct, deploy and even manipulate different frames.
Perhaps all actors in and observers of the story could draw lessons from the contrasting local and international interpretations of the mass recall’s outcome.
Lo Ming-cheng is a professor of sociology at the University of California-Davis whose research addresses civil society, political cultures and medical sociology.
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