Starting this month, young women in Denmark would be subject to conscription on the same terms as men. All Danes, regardless of gender, would be required to register for military assessment, and eligible individuals would be selected through a lottery-based draft. In addition, service time would be increased to 11 months, and conscript numbers would grow to meet national defense targets.
Denmark is not alone. In the past few years, several European countries, most notably Sweden and Norway, have adopted gender-neutral conscription systems. Latvia is moving in the same direction. The war in Ukraine has accelerated this trend. Faced with the return of high-intensity war to the continent, European democracies are rethinking not just how many people they need in uniform, but who.
What makes Denmark’s decision especially noteworthy is that it comes in the absence of any direct attack. Denmark is a wealthy, stable democracy protected by NATO — the world’s most powerful military alliance — but it still took the difficult political step of expanding conscription to women in the name of national preparedness.
Meanwhile, in Taiwan, where the threat is arguably far more immediate, the topic remains taboo. A few months ago, there were media reports that the Ministry of National Defense was considering the integration of women into mandatory military service. The government’s response was swift and unequivocal: There are no such plans. The ministry emphasized that conscription policy is guided by national security needs and constitutional constraints. The Executive Yuan and the Presidential Office echoed the same position. The idea was dismissed before any real conversation could begin.
However, it is not just the government that refuses to engage. The military establishment, academia and civil society remain largely silent. The public, including many women, has shown little appetite to raise the issue. For a country that faces a persistent security threat and a deepening personnel shortage, this silence is remarkable.
Taiwan is rightly praised for its gender equality. It leads Asia and is considered one of the leading countries in the world on this front. It has had a female president, strong female labor force participation and one of Asia’s most progressive records on LGBTQ+ rights. Yet when it comes to national defense, arguably the most basic responsibility of democratic citizenship, gender equality abruptly vanishes. Women remain completely exempt from mandatory service.
This exemption continues despite a worsening demographic outlook. Taiwan’s birthrate is one of the lowest in the world. The military struggles to meet volunteer quotas even after raising salaries and easing entry standards. Some officials have even floated the idea of recruiting foreign workers. The most direct and logical option — opening conscription to women — remains off the table.
The arguments against it are familiar. Officials often cite the Council of Grand Justices’ Interpretation No. 490, issued in 1999, which upheld male-only conscription on the basis of physical and social role differences. However, the ruling did not ban reform. It explicitly grants the legislature the discretion to revise policy based on evolving defense needs.
Military officials also raise logistical concerns: barracks space, training capacity and ongoing challenges in managing male recruits. Some argue that Taiwan’s military already has a gender composition comparable to other countries based on volunteer numbers. However, these arguments reveal institutional resistance, not legal or operational impossibility.
There is also a cultural argument. The idea that women are socially unsuited for conscription has become an untested assumption, rarely subjected to public debate or democratic scrutiny. As long as no one raises the issue, no one has to confront it.
Finally, invoking public opposition as a reason to avoid the issue is circular. Public attitudes are shaped by the signals and choices of political elites. If leaders fail to raise the issue, the public cannot be expected to generate spontaneous support. Leadership, not public opinion, should drive national defense policy, especially in a high-stakes security environment like Taiwan’s.
Avoiding the conversation comes at a cost. Debating whether women belong in the armed forces is increasingly disconnected from reality. Taiwanese women already serve voluntarily as officers, pilots, engineers and intelligence personnel. Their presence in the military is established, not experimental. However, the vast majority of women remain exempt from the most basic obligation of citizenship. This disconnect weakens Taiwan’s defense readiness and the credibility of its democratic ideals.
Around the world, several democratic states have integrated women into national defense out of necessity, not just principle. In Israel, women have long served as part of the national draft, filling vital roles in intelligence, cyber, logistics and combat units. These countries show that when the security situation demands it, inclusion becomes a matter of survival, not ideology.
The lesson for Taiwan is not to mimic any one model, but to recognize that meaningful reform rarely begins with cultural consensus. In most cases, public attitudes adjust only after institutions take the first step. Including women in service does not require identical roles or standards, but it does demand a clear policy commitment and sustained investment. It also affirms that national defense is a shared civic duty, not one assigned by gender.
Above all, Taiwan needs political leadership that is unafraid to engage directly with difficult and unpopular questions. The country cannot afford to let cultural hesitation or fear of political backlash paralyze national strategy. If leaders want to be taken seriously, they must act like it by confronting tough realities, not avoiding them.
While Taiwan has not yet fallen short of its defense manpower goals, current trends indicate that it soon would if recruitment and retention rates continue to decline. The predicted shortfall poses a serious challenge to sustaining the nation’s military needs over time.
Moreover, in the event of conflict and casualties, the demand for additional personnel to reinforce and replace losses would only intensify the pressure on Taiwan’s already strained manpower pool. Every year that reform is delayed makes addressing this growing gap more urgent and complex.
Taiwan’s reluctance to consider extending conscription to women is a strategic oversight. It reflects a mismatch between the country’s demographic realities, its security needs and its professed values. Reframing this issue as a matter of national security, not gender politics, could finally open the door to the policy shift Taiwan urgently requires.
Mor Sobol is an associate professor at Tamkang University’s Department of Diplomacy and International Relations.
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