As arctic ice melts and global warming advances, the arctic is transforming into a new hub for trade, infrastructure and strategic competition. Although distant, Taiwan cannot ignore this shift. As a major maritime economy with top shipping companies like Evergreen Marine and Yang Ming Marine, Taiwan’s strategic focus is expanding beyond the South China Sea to include northern polar waters. Given its trade dependence and logistics strength, Taiwan should adapt to emerging arctic routes and governance. Failing to engage in arctic developments risks weakening the nation’s strategic position as global shipping patterns evolve.
The Northern Sea Route (NSR), which runs along the Russian arctic coast, has gained attention as receding sea ice extends the navigable period each year. This route can cut travel time between East Asia and Europe by up to 40 percent, compared with the traditional passage through the Suez Canal. Although still limited by harsh conditions and infrastructure challenges, the NSR is drawing increasing interest from global shipping powers, particularly China.
In 2018, China released its arctic policy white paper, describing itself as a “Near-arctic State” and promoting the development of a Polar Silk Road. This initiative, framed as an arctic extension of the Belt and Road Initiative, envisions building sea lanes, energy projects and digital infrastructure across the Arctic Ocean. Beijing’s ambitions are already visible. Chinese state-owned firms have invested in Russia’s Yamal liquefied natural gas (LNG) and Arctic LNG 2 projects, developed icebreakers such as Xue Long and Xue Long 2, and supported port construction in Greenland and Iceland. Chinese firms are also engaging in seabed mapping and arctic scientific research, consolidating Beijing’s long-term presence in the region.
These developments are part of broader trends, economic, scientific and geopolitical, that reflect growing international interest in shaping the future architecture of arctic connectivity. Should these efforts lead to the establishment of stable commercial routes, particularly between Europe and East Asia, they might gradually influence global shipping patterns. In the long term, this could have implications for existing maritime hubs in the Indo-Pacific region, including Taiwan, whose strategic position has traditionally benefited from established southern sea lanes. It is important to maintain realistic expectations:
The arctic is unlikely to supplant the Malacca-Suez axis in the near term. Navigation remains constrained by harsh ice conditions, seasonal variability, and unresolved legal and regulatory frameworks. Nonetheless, the increasing pace of investment and strategic planning, particularly by actors such as China and Russia, suggests that some form of commercially viable arctic shipping might emerge over the coming decades. As these developments unfold, Taiwan’s limited involvement in polar affairs could represent a strategic blind spot in its long-term maritime outlook.
Taiwan’s limited presence in arctic affairs stems not only from external geopolitical constraints, but also from its own diplomatic limitations and historically low levels of strategic engagement in polar governance frameworks. Taiwan has no formal affiliation with the Arctic Council, the region’s central intergovernmental forum. Yet not all participants in the council are arctic states. Singapore, India, Japan, China and South Korea, geographically distant from the polar circle, were granted observer status in 2013. Their arguments were compelling: As major players in global shipping and climate governance, they underscored a legitimate stake in the arctic’s future. This precedent matters. If Singapore, a tropical city-state, can credibly argue for its involvement based on its shipping relevance, then Taiwan, with a larger maritime economy and one of the world’s top shipping fleets, has a similarly strong, if not stronger, rationale.
While full participation in the Arctic Council might be politically challenging due to Taiwan’s unique international status, alternative pathways exist. Taiwan could pursue engagement through scientific cooperation, climate research or by aligning with observer-state models used by non-arctic actors. Engaging in scientific cooperation, contributing to polar environmental studies and collaborating with like-minded arctic democracies could help establish a quiet, but credible presence. Institutions such as Academia Sinica, the Ocean Affairs Council or Taiwanese universities could initiate joint research on arctic navigation, climate impact or maritime sustainability.
Such steps would not only raise Taiwan’s arctic profile, but also help diversify its diplomatic partnerships. Countries like Norway, Canada and Denmark (via Greenland) have overlapping interests in science, environment and maritime governance. Engaging these actors in the arctic space could open new channels for dialogue, research and even strategic cooperation, without provoking a political backlash.
As China deepens its presence in the arctic through infrastructure projects, digital connectivity and shipping investments under its Polar Silk Road initiative, its actual influence in the region remains limited for now, but the ambition is evident. Beijing is steadily positioning itself as a long-term stakeholder in a region once considered peripheral to global trade. Without greater engagement, Taiwan risks missing opportunities to shape emerging maritime norms and secure access to evolving trade routes. In this context, arctic engagement is not a luxury, but a strategic consideration for the future.
To remain competitive and relevant over the long term, Taiwan should begin exploring avenues for constructive participation in arctic affairs, not through confrontation, but through curiosity, cooperation and contribution. This could involve expanding investment in polar research, cultivating stronger ties with arctic institutions and articulating Taiwan’s commitment to sustainable development in the region. Such efforts need not disrupt the existing geopolitical balance, but they can help ensure that Taiwan remains a stakeholder in the future of global maritime governance. For a maritime economy like Taiwan, the arctic might seem geographically remote, but its strategic implications are drawing ever closer. As melting ice reshapes coastlines and reconfigures shipping routes, it is also redrawing the global map of influence. Taiwan cannot afford to remain on the sidelines.
Tran Thi Mong Tuyen is a doctoral student at National Chengchi University.
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