Secretary of State Marco Rubio raised eyebrows recently when he declared the era of American unipolarity over. He described America’s unrivaled dominance of the international system as an anomaly that was created by the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. Now, he observed, the United States was returning to a more multipolar world where there are great powers in different parts of the planet. He pointed to China and Russia, as well as “rogue states like Iran and North Korea” as examples of countries the United States must contend with.
This all begs the question: If American unipolarity is over, what comes next? Will America gracefully accept relative decline and embrace its role as a node in a more multipolar world? Will Washington pursue regional hegemonic stability, whereby it prioritizes economic integration, rules of the road, active mediation of disputes, and forward deployment of military forces to elevate its leadership role in Asia? Or will the United States seek to form a concert with other major powers to carve up the world into spheres of influence?
Many experts presently are debating whether Trump has designs to divide the world into separate spheres, much as Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin did toward the end of World War II. Such an approach, some experts contend, would fill Trump’s desire to be remembered as a historic figure who transformed the world order.
Such speculation is fueled in part by Trump’s enthusiasm for negotiating deals with other great powers. Trump has sought to negotiate Ukraine’s borders directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin in exchange for a cessation of hostilities. He also has signaled his desire to negotiate major new deals with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平).
Trump also has invoked the Monroe Doctrine to declare that the Western Hemisphere falls within a US sphere of influence. In a 2018 address to the United Nations, Trump described the Monroe Doctrine as “the formal policy of our country.” Trump has since signaled his expectation that the region would comply with American dominance.
Following his return to office this January, Trump has pushed further down the path of seeking to assert American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. For example, he has declared his intention to seize Greenland from Denmark, re-establish American control of the Panama Canal, and compel Canada to become a part of the United States. Rubio also has focused considerable attention on the region, presenting himself as an implementor of Trump’s strategic designs.
America’s aggressive efforts in its backyard have generated speculation among experts that Trump’s aim is to treat the Western Hemisphere as an American bastion. To gain Chinese and Russian acceptance of this arrangement, some experts believe, Trump might be willing to defer to Beijing and Moscow to dominate their own backyards. Trump’s former deputy national security advisor, Matt Pottinger, was so alarmed by this prospect that he published a public memo to Trump warning of the dangers of such an approach.
The people of Taiwan naturally have a deep interest in whether the world will move in this new era toward spheres of influence. If it did, then presumably China would exercise control over its Asian periphery, including possibly Taiwan. I view such an imagined future as a high risk, low probability scenario for Taiwan for at least three reasons.
First, Trump famously does not do strategy. He has strongly held convictions on certain topics, such as immigration and trade, but he has never articulated a vision for how the world should be organized. Trump has relied on his instincts throughout his career. He experiments and improvises. He does not adhere to grand strategies, and he does not abide by attempts by others to lock him into long-term plans. Trump is famously incurious about the contents of America’s quadrennial national security strategy documents. Rubio also has made clear that there is not discussion within the Trump administration about spheres of influence.
Second, the present moment is far different than the end of World War II. At that time, Allied powers were on the cusp of absolute victory over the Axis powers. Large parts of Europe and Asia were reduced to rubble. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States exercised preponderant influence over a battered world.
Now, by contrast, power is more evenly distributed. Countries have both capabilities and agency to pursue their interests. China faces capable countries along its periphery who all are united by a common objective of resisting any attempt by Beijing to establish an exclusive sphere of influence. The national identity of every country in Asia is defined by its distinctness from China.
Additionally, there are not power vacuums in Asia or further afield for China to fill. America views Asia as the most dynamic region of the world that will be a primary engine of global economic growth in the coming century. There is no meaningful constituency in the United States calling for America to abandon its presence in Asia.
Similarly, countries across the developing world view their interests as being served by maintaining constructive relations with multiple major powers, as opposed to aligning exclusively with one. Even if Trump wanted to get Latin American countries to align solely with the United States, he would fail. China now is the largest or second-largest trading partner with virtually every country in the region. A similar story can be told in Africa, the Middle East, and South and Central Asia. China will not abandon its presence in Latin America any more willingly than America will withdraw from its role in Asia.
To be sure, Taiwan faces real challenges at home and abroad, such as political polarization, energy and labor shortages, and China’s ever-constant pressure. Taiwan does not need to add a hypothetical risk of a Chinese sphere of influence to its list of challenges. The world is growing more disordered. It is not dividing into spheres of influence, and it will not any time soon.
Ryan Hass is a senior fellow, the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and the Director of the China Center at the Brookings Institution.
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