The selection of Robert Francis Prevost as the successor to Pope Francis is part of an internal Catholic Church desire to continue the latter’s reform agenda. In terms of international relations, the key question is whether Pope Leo XIV would choose to maintain the path of engagement with China that his predecessor had begun.
The discussion centers on a controversial 2018 agreement between China and the Vatican, designed to share the authority for appointing bishops in the Chinese state-controlled Catholic Church. Critically, China has breached this agreement, appointing bishops without prior Holy See approval, thereby exposing its real agenda.
Despite these developments in the implementation of the agreement, which was renewed last year, the Holy See remains convinced that it can best serve the interests of the Catholic community in China through an understanding that faces an uncertain path to full realization.
Whether this might lead to the recognition of China as a state, potentially replacing or coexisting with the recognition currently afforded to Taiwan, is a separate issue for which no clear basis exists.
The concept of an inherent equation between “pacification” and “normalization” must be rejected, given the Holy See’s conviction of the opportuneness of not revolutionizing the existing balances that underpin its foreign policy agenda in Asia and beyond.
Therefore, when speaking of “continuity” in governance, it can indeed be assumed that Leo would continue to consider himself bound by the agreement signed with China last year, despite being aware of Beijing’s unwillingness to adhere to the bilateral terms agreed upon in 2018, while at the same time being reluctant to make any sort of formal recognition.
However, a distinct layer of analysis can be introduced, given Leo’s personal view of relations with China and Taiwan. In this regard, a compelling insight is provided by the remarks of outgoing ambassador to the Vatican Matthew Lee (李世明) about a meeting with then-cardinal Prevost in 2023.
The then-cardinal had emphasized his full awareness of the differences between “democratic Taiwan” and “communist China,” Lee told the Central News Agency. This serves as component in the emerging portrait of Prevost, a figure keenly aware of the need to align with democracies during an era increasingly conducive to the proliferation of authoritarian regimes.
Further proof of this comes from statements made by Leo to Peru’s Seminario Expresion in 2022 regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He had spoken of an imperialistic design implemented by Russian President Vladimir Putin to increase his sphere of influence in Europe.
Even if Prevost’s statements have softened since his election as pontiff, looking back at his previous remarks can serve as a valuable indicator for imagining the foreign policy trajectories his pontificate might take.
Specifically, Leo’s steadfast commitment to human rights and democratic values, of which he has always been an advocate, suggests a firm basis for a decisive stance should tensions escalate in the Taiwan Strait.
Given these considerations, assuming that former vice president Chen Chien-jen’s (陳建仁) attendance at the inauguration of Leo’s pontificate, in place of President William Lai (賴清德), indicates a “pattern of the Holy See’s careful calibration to avoid offending Beijing” is a pessimistic outlook unsupported by concrete evidence.
Leo’s actual foreign policy agenda, coupled with the broader signals he sends, would be the true indicators of the Church’s general direction. Premature judgements risk a partial representation of reality, hindering the ability to analyze events in the most accurate and objective way.
Therefore, it is crucial to analyze events with the instruments at observers’ disposal, steering clear of biased interpretations that cannot capture the true subtleties of reality.
The foundations are certainly different from those experienced since the very beginning of former pope Francis’ election, who declined the invitation to visit Taiwan and repeatedly expressed hopes of visiting China.
Given these distinct initial conditions, the prospect of genuinely strengthened relations between Taiwan and the Holy See is a tangible one. By undertaking a conducive action to deepen ties with Taipei, Leo would demonstrate his firm commitment to democratic and liberal values. Therefore, we must refute the pessimistic forecasts that are circulating before the new pope’s concrete actions could be assessed.
Michele Maresca is an analyst at Il Caffe Geopolitico, an online international law journal, and the think tank Geopol21.
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