In debates over Russia, the argument often comes down to a simple proposition: Having struggled for three years and seen his forces mauled in Ukraine, is it really plausible that Russian President Vladimir Putin would take on the combined might of NATO? It is time to put that question to bed. I spent a day last week with a large group of generals and other officers in uniform from about 20 countries. They had collected at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London to talk about the recreation of army corps as the primary organizational unit for fighting wars.
These are the large, combined service formations we thought redundant once the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, but are now — largely thanks to Putin — back in fashion. What I walked away with was the understanding that those who would have to do any fighting are not asking if the threat of a Russian attack on a NATO member is real, but rather where, when and in what form it comes. Nor are they speculating over what US President Donald Trump might or might not do. Their biggest concern is how little time they might have to prepare.
At the start of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NATO commanders were as surprised as anyone else by the ineptness of the Russian assault on Kyiv, a debacle that saw the cream of Moscow’s combat troops and equipment destroyed, but any complacency that followed has now gone.
Rather than five to 10 years, as once thought, the working estimate for when Putin might have the capabilities to take on NATO once he is done in Ukraine is now multi-layered and comes from a Danish intelligence assessment earlier this year: six months for a localized attack, two years for a regional Baltic war and five for any wider European conflict.
The combat force Putin has in the field is by now twice as large as when he ordered the invasion in 2022, and he continues to recruit. Production of arms and munitions has soared. Exposure to the advanced Western weaponry — think High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) — has allowed the Russians time to figure out how to neutralize them. The absolute advantage Ukraine once held in battlefield innovation has evaporated. The Russian air force, built to fight NATO, is modern and has been preserved intact.
RUSSIAN ADAPTION
Again and again, I heard something approaching admiration for the speed at which Russian forces have learned and adapted in Ukraine. In terms of drone and electronic warfare, Russia is probably ahead of NATO. The war has proved that having a small number of exquisitely capable uncrewed aircraft cannot compete for impact with sheer quantity and adaptability.
Less well understood is that Russia also has been improving the accuracy and survivability of its cruise and ballistic missiles. The Iskander — a rough equivalent to Army Tactical Missile Systems — has become difficult even for US-made Patriot batteries to intercept, and it is getting used to hitting everything from HIMARS launchers to Ukrainian command posts. Most sobering for Western generals is the continued demonstration of Russia’s near-total indifference to casualty rates, creating a latitude for Putin and his generals that their NATO counterparts would not have.
POLITICAL WILL
One speaker after another at RUSI’s conference spoke of the need to shift their own priorities toward force protection, and the expectations of Europe’s political leaders and populations toward high casualty rates.
Neither Russia’s ability to attack nor its goals were subjects of dispute. The presumption was that Putin aims to reestablish Russia as a great power in Europe and so would continue trying to subjugate former Russian colonies and break NATO. To achieve that, there is no cause to invade Poland, which is how skeptics often pose the question. Breaking NATO is best done by discrediting the Article 5 collective defense clause that lies at its heart. That commitment gives Europe’s small nations the confidence to defy dictates and demands from Moscow, but it is based on trust in the willingness of others to act and is therefore fragile.
To undermine that trust would require only a messy attack on, say, Estonia, something Putin would have the capacity to do even now. The European leaders deciding how to respond would have to take into account some considerable risks before agreeing.
First, the new corps are not ready. The US has four, of which one — the 18th Airborne — would be able to deploy quickly in the outbreak of a Russia-NATO conflict. It includes two infantry and two airborne divisions (the storied 82d and 101st), as well as intelligence, medical, signals, artillery and military police brigades.
However, even the 18th is still experimenting, as it tries to figure out how to win dominance in the new kind of war that is being waged in Ukraine, in which tens of thousands of drones make it difficult to hide or maneuver.
The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, a UK-led NATO equivalent, is still being assembled, with up to a year to go until it can mirror the range of capabilities the US’ 18th can field.
Ready or not, US, UK, French, German, Italian and other forces would all have to get to the eastern front across a spider’s web of bottlenecks, national transit license requirements and inadequate infrastructure.
NATO has a team working hard on that, but the exercises to demonstrate to Moscow that the alliance can rush forces to the east are not scheduled until 2027. More concerning still is that, unlike Ukraine, whose long logistical tail is strung across countries at peace to the west and is therefore protected, NATO’s would be attacked from the outset. Every European port, warehouse, factory and railway siding involved in the war’s supply chain would become a legitimate target for Russian missile strikes.
NEW CONSENSUS
It is not all bad news. Critically, there is now a stronger consensus within Europe on the issue of whether Putin should be stopped in Ukraine, even if there are exceptions such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Money’s being made available to rearm.
The UK’s new Strategic Defence Review, due this week, is expected to allocate ￡1 billion (US$1.35 billion) to buy drones and speed battlefield decisions. Yet the clock is ticking. Europe’s still moving at peacetime’s too-bureaucratic pace, while the US has been kicking into reverse.
Both need to change. It is Putin who would decide what he does and when, and the hesitancy of the West simply creates a window for him to act, whether in Ukraine or beyond. As retired British General and former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe Rupert Smith put it: “you fight with what you’ve got in your hand on the day.”
On current trajectories, that might not be enough to deter the Kremlin from pressing on with its great power plans.
Marc Champion is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Europe, Russia and the Middle East. He was previously Istanbul bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal.This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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