For two nations that say they want to avoid escalation, India and Pakistan seem trapped in a dangerously spiraling conflict.
India’s strikes on Pakistan and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir on Wednesday were clearly telegraphed — a fitting answer, it believes, for last month’s terror attack in Kashmir. In response, Islamabad said it has shot down five of New Delhi’s aircraft. Civilians are now dead on both sides.
Avoiding any further intensification is critical for these nuclear-armed states. Keeping diplomatic channels open is crucial, too. The alternative is a cycle of counterstrikes that risks dangerous missteps.
For New Delhi, that calculated military action was a show of strength — a powerful blow against what it calls the “terrorist infrastructure” inside Pakistan. In a statement on Wednesday, the Indian Ministry of Defense described it as a “precise and restrained response” meant to avoid escalation. The airstrikes hit nine locations, officials said, and marked the deepest breach of Pakistani territory since the 1971 war.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has consistently said that the perpetrators of the attack that killed 26 people — mostly tourists — in Pahalgam would be brought to justice. The strikes have been called “Operation Sindoor,” a reference to the red powder used in Hindu ceremonies and sometimes worn by women as a sign of their married status. Officials say it is also a way to honor the women who lost their husbands in the assault.
In military operations, messaging is everything. Ahead of a press briefing by Foreign Secretary of India Vikram Misri, officials broadcast a video cataloguing attacks that New Delhi attributes to Pakistan-backed terrorist groups — claims Islamabad denies.
Intelligence sources showed there was evidence the Kashmir attack was planned from Pakistan, Misri said, adding that India’s military had targeted “known terror camps” and avoided civilian, economic or military targets.
Islamabad said that is not true.
The claims and denials are part of a decades-old grievance that has found fresh life. The nations have been locked in a fraught and often volatile rivalry that is almost always simmering. They have fought several wars since their violent partition following independence from the UK in 1947. Kashmir has been at the heart of the hostilities.
On many occasions they had been on the brink of major conflict, yet have successfully climbed down. They would be wise to follow a similar course of action this time.
The last close call was in 2019, after a suicide bomber killed 40 members of India’s security forces. New Delhi retaliated with its first airstrikes on Pakistani soil since 1971. Islamabad shot down a jet in response, and captured a pilot, who was subsequently released. Tensions dissipated, and in 2021, the two sides signed a ceasefire agreement at the disputed border in Kashmir, known as the Line of Control.
This time, events might not follow such a familiar script. There are likely to be domestic and institutional pressures in Pakistan to escalate, said Harsh Pant, vice president for studies and foreign policy at the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation.
“India has given Pakistan some space to maneuver by saying these strikes are non-escalatory in nature, but whether Islamabad uses that is their call,” he said. “Escalation logic can easily become the dominant narrative.”
Both sides are playing to their domestic audiences. In India, a nationalist frenzy has been whipped up by media loyal to Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party, catering to a public hungry for justice. Images of widows have been playing nonstop across television screens, while little attention is paid to dissent within Kashmir. The government insists that militants aimed to disrupt a return to “normalcy” in the region, despite ongoing concerns about its decision to revoke its autonomy in 2019.
In Pakistan, public sentiment is growing more hostile. The suspension of a longstanding agreement governing water sharing, the Indus Waters Treaty, has ratcheted up tensions. Millions of farmers depend on those flows, and Islamabad has warned that it views India’s measures as an act of war. It has also signaled a willingness to talk, if New Delhi stands down.
The international community is watching closely. The UN and others have urged restraint. India has spoken to a host of countries to lay out its aims, but would also want strategic partners to pressure Islamabad and align with its policy on terrorism. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif held an emergency security meeting on Wednesday.
The country “reserves the right to respond, in self-defense, at a time, place and manner of its choosing,” his office said in a statement.
If the two do declare the military hostilities over, there is still one significant pressure point New Delhi can use: the Financial Action Task Force and its gray list. Islamabad was only removed from the list — which helps track money laundering and terrorism financing — in 2022 after spending four years there alongside nations such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique. It would be loathe to be added again.
The real work is likely happening behind the scenes, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio speaking to both nations. The United Arab Emirates has helped to broker peace before and could be called upon again.
Diplomatic efforts must match the urgency of the moment. Miscalculation now could open a third front when the world is already managing war in Ukraine and conflict in Israel and Gaza. It can ill afford another.
Karishma Vaswani is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asia politics with a special focus on China. Previously, she was the BBC’s lead Asia presenter and worked for the BBC across Asia and South Asia for two decades.
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