Maybe it is Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy who should be writing books about the art of negotiation. For a while, it looked as though he had made a huge miscalculation by highlighting the opportunities available to allies in exploiting his nation’s natural resources. The idea was to interest the famously transactional US President Donald Trump in Ukraine’s defense, and it seemed a clever ruse at the time. In the event, it almost blew up a military relationship critical to Ukraine’s survival, but the deal as now at least partially agreed looks like a good save.
We do not yet have the published text, and — according to a Ukrainian news agency that saw the documents — an important further “technical” protocol remains to be signed. Still, if the agreement is as described by Ukrainskaya Pravda and Ukrainian Minister of Economic Development and Trade Yulia Svyrydenko, who drove the final negotiation, it at least averted disaster and could serve a little of the original purpose. The neocolonial terms of exploitation in previously leaked US drafts that Trump clearly expected Zelenskiy to sign on the spot — because he exploded in anger when that did not happen — are no longer there.
The US would not have legal jurisdiction over the joint fund to be created, is not in full control, but must make decisions by consensus in a 50/50 arrangement and would not own any assets. Only future investments are to be included. Nor would US companies get right of first refusal on all projects, a provision that would have clashed with Ukraine’s plans for joining the EU. In fact, as described, the deal now includes a clause that allows for revision if terms do prove to contravene EU membership requirements.
There is also no mention of back payments to cover previous US war aid to date (which was given in the form of grants not to be repaid), nor any ridiculous figure as to what that would require (at one point Trump talked about US$350 billion, or even US$500 billion, four times the actual total). Ukrainian infrastructure is no longer to be included in the fund. There is a list of 57 minerals, including natural gas, that are — but, again, the fund would draw and divide revenue only from extraction licenses issued after the fund’s formation.What this seems to have become is a deal that could give Trump political cover to resume the provision of arms to Ukraine, should he choose, by creating a mechanism for repayment, without destroying Zelenskiy.
Ukrainians said the US can add future arms provisions as capital contributions to the fund and can withdraw profits to recover those costs after 10 years. Until then, all revenue would go to Ukraine’s reconstruction.
There is no hiding that Trump and his administration wanted more. The earlier drafts were so punitive that they seemed designed to force Zelenskiy into a position where he either rejected the approach outright, allowing Trump to cut off arms supplies and force Ukraine’s capitulation, or accept and be swept away by public outrage. Whatever the plan was, Trump also appears to have miscalculated. Zelenskiy fell into neither trap. Even during his explosive Oval Office humiliation, he somehow managed to hold his own without burning all bridges.
It has been a strategy of dogged persistence, and he might need more of it. That technical protocol includes some of the key wins the Ukrainian side has been claiming, including the question of legal jurisdiction and the 10-year rule on US withdrawals. These would be critical to getting the Verkhovna Rada — the Ukrainian parliament — and Ukrainians in general to accept that this is a deal that would aid, rather than exploit them, which is already a difficult task.
Even once complete, it is unclear what this tumultuous negotiation would have achieved. Although proposed by Washington as an agreement to help deter Russia by putting US companies and personnel in the way of any potential attack, it is more realistic to view that in reverse. What the arrangement proves to be and do would be determined almost entirely by what happens in settlement talks with Russia, and how Trump responds to those.
Should the war end quickly, the new US-Ukraine fund could well have an economic role to play. If not, investment is improbable, and Trump can either ignore the deal or — less likely — use it to rearm Ukraine. At a minimum, it could be used to pay for continued, critical US intelligence support. Either way, if the remaining documents get signed as planned, Zelenskiy and his negotiators look to have neutralized a potentially fatal dispute.
Marc Champion is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Europe, Russia and the Middle East. He was previously Istanbul bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal.
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