This is hardly a golden era of diplomacy. A ceasefire — let alone a lasting peace — between Russia and Ukraine remains a distant possibility, and neither Israel nor Hamas seems to view a long-term truce in Gaza as a priority. The one bright spot on the global diplomatic chessboard might be the relationship between the US and Iran.
Yes, you read that correctly: The same US that Iran’s ruling clerics have called “the Great Satan” since the Islamic Revolution nearly half a century ago. The same US that supported the Shah until his ouster in 1979. The same US that killed Qassem Suleimani, commander of Iran’s powerful Quds Force, just five years ago.
Iran, for its part, is the same country that held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days from late 1979 to 1981. The same Iran that backs Hamas — the group responsible for the terrorist attacks against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 — and the Yemeni Houthis targeting the US military and international shipping. And the same Iran that has reportedly explored options to assassinate US President Donald Trump and members of his first administration.
Illustration: Mountain People
So, why would Iran be interested in signing a new agreement with Trump, who unilaterally withdrew from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — the nuclear accord between Iran and some of the world’s major powers — during his first term?
IRAN’S MOTIVATION
Two reasons stand out. For starters, it would help Iran avoid a direct military attack by Israel and/or the US — something it proved ill-equipped to defend against as recently as October last year, when Israel successfully targeted its missile and drone manufacturing sites and air defenses. With Iran’s weak and ailing economy on the ropes, a new agreement could provide much-needed sanctions relief and potentially ease domestic political pressure on the regime.
But what is in it for Trump? He clearly wants a dramatic diplomatic achievement. He tried and failed with North Korea in his first term, and has so far come up empty-handed in his attempts to negotiate an end to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. A nuclear accord with Iran might well be his best chance.
Moreover, Trump has publicly pledged that Iran will not develop or acquire nuclear weapons on his watch. The urgency is real, as Iran has steadily inched closer to assembling the components needed to build one or more nuclear weapons.
To be sure, there are good strategic reasons for Trump to pursue a deal with Iran. If diplomacy and military force fail, and Iran succeeds in developing a nuclear weapon, the result could be a nuclear arms race across the Middle East. A nuclear-armed Iran could also deploy its many proxy forces — including Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis — with even greater impunity.
However, there are many questions that must be answered before an agreement can be signed:
First, what nuclear materials would Iran be permitted to retain or produce? Specifically, would it be allowed to enrich or keep enriched uranium and, if so, how much and to what level?
The second issue concerns monitoring. How would the US ensure that Iran is living up to its commitments? And to what extent would a closed-off Iran be willing to open itself up to outside experts tasked with assessing compliance?
A third set of questions involves the scope of the agreement. Would it be limited to nuclear materials, or would it also cover other essential elements like bomb components, missiles, testing activities or Iran’s support for regional proxies?
DURATION, FORM
Fourth, what would be the duration of the deal? Would it include sunset clauses, like the JCPOA, or would it be open-ended?
And fifth, what form would the agreement take? Iran might seek assurances that Trump and his successors on both sides of the aisle will stand by the accord, possibly by insisting that the US Congress approves it.
There is a potential compromise that could give both sides what they need. Iran would be permitted to maintain a small amount of low-enriched nuclear fuel suitable for civilian purposes only. There would be extensive external monitoring. In return, Iran would receive some sanctions relief, with the possibility of more relief if the agreement covered additional issues. The agreement could be open-ended or run, say, through 2050 — or better yet, 2075. Congress, along with its Iranian counterpart, would be required to approve the deal.
Such an outcome would set back — not just pause — Iran’s progress toward producing nuclear weapons. At the same time, it would allow Iran to claim it had preserved a nuclear option while reaping economic benefits. It would likely be well received by much of its population, which wants improved living standards and reduced international isolation.
Most importantly, Iran’s leadership wants to preserve the embattled system created by the 1979 revolution. That objective has prompted major policy shifts in the past: In 1988, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini agreed to end the war with Iraq without achieving victory — a decision he likened to drinking poison — to save the Islamic Republic. The same reasoning could be applied now.
Trump, for his part, could claim to have produced a more comprehensive pact than the one he discarded — and of considerably longer duration. No doubt, some in Israel and the US would grumble that he gave up too much, but Trump’s political flanks are strong enough to see it through. This deal would also allow him to avoid new military entanglements.
US-Iran relations are at a critical juncture. The US faced a similar dilemma in the early 1990s, when it had an opportunity to strike North Korean nuclear facilities, but ultimately held back, fearing that North Korea would retaliate by invading South Korea, where tens of thousands of US troops were stationed.
The aftermath of the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks has made clear that today’s Iran does not pose a comparable threat. Still, Trump might be reluctant to test that assessment, given that Iran could harm its neighbors and drive up oil prices, fueling inflation and slowing economic growth. It is this convergence of risks and interests that makes the situation surprisingly ripe for a diplomatic breakthrough.
Richard Haass, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, is a senior counselor at Centerview Partners, distinguished university scholar at New York University and the author of the weekly Substack newsletter Home & Away.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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