As the highest elected official in the nation’s capital, Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an (蔣萬安) is the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) candidate-in-waiting for a presidential bid. With the exception of Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕), Chiang is the most likely KMT figure to take over the mantle of the party leadership. All the other usual suspects, from Legislative Speaker Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) to New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi (侯友宜) to KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) have already been rejected at the ballot box.
Given such high expectations, Chiang should be demonstrating resolve, calm-headedness and political wisdom in how he faces tough challenges in government. He should also show that he can seek consensus and support within the party before going off half-cocked with spurious ideas that are still-born the second they leave his mouth.
It has not been a good week for Chiang, but his travails have been largely self-inflicted.
First, he attended a protest in Taipei on Thursday last week, showing support for party staffers that had been detained for questioning over alleged forged signatures connected to a recall campaign of Democratic Progressive Party legislators. In doing so, the Taipei mayor knowingly participated in an unauthorized gathering in a restricted area, contravening the Assembly and Parade Act (集會遊行法).
He later said that he was participating in the protest not as mayor, but in his capacity as a private citizen. That makes no sense. His attendance reveals a lack of political wisdom, his excuse insults the intelligence of the Taipei residents he has been elected to represent and his actions put the police force of his own city in a difficult position.
Next is his proposal to hold a vote of no confidence in Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) and bring down the Cabinet. He initially proposed the move on Thursday last week and reiterated it yesterday. The opposition could technically pull off such a vote; it has the numbers. Unfortunately for Chiang, the proposal has neither the support of Chu, or Taiwan People’s Party Chairman Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌).
There are good reasons Chu and Huang oppose it, but they are not the same reasons — of “upholding democracy” or “bringing down President William Lai (賴清德)” — that they are attempting to spin as a distraction from the recall movement against KMT lawmakers. The reasons are that a vote of no confidence in Cho would set off a chain of events that could lead to Lai dissolving the legislature and holding new legislative elections. That such a result would be disastrous for the KMT in the current political climate is obvious to anyone who gives it a second’s thought, with the exception, apparently, of Chiang.
The issue came up last month, when rumors circulated that Chu was considering bringing down the Cabinet as a tactic to distract from the mass recalls. He denied it at the time, and the shortcomings of the tactic were addressed in a March 13 editorial for this paper, “Fu no better chairman than Chu.” That only deepens the mystery of why Chiang is bringing it up now, and why he insists on clinging to it.
As Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation chairman Michael You (游盈隆) pointed out in a Facebook post, that Chiang is sticking to his guns on the absurd proposal strongly suggests that it was not a spurious idea. Again, what is the thinking behind it?
After the unforced errors and flawed reasoning Chiang has demonstrated in the past week, voters need to take a close look at his suitability for national office.
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