Designated German chancellor Friedrich Merz secured a coalition deal last week that opens the door to unlimited defense spending. Now, he faces a far harder task: turning Germany into a military power strong enough to deter Russian President Vladimir Putin without US support.
The agreement amounts to a sweeping and historic overhaul of Germany’s approach to defense. It encompasses the creation of a permanent off-budget fund and a new National Security Council. It also includes a firm commitment to its NATO obligations, a major upgrade of Germany’s cyber and intelligence capabilities, and the introduction of measures to streamline procurement and integration efforts with the EU. The country has pledged, for the first time since 1945, to build a military capable of defending national and allied territories.
“Germany is back on track,” Merz said after the signing. “We will fulfill our obligations in terms of defense.”
However, that might be easier said than done.
Germany’s defense and national security apparatus is fragmented and encumbered by bureaucracy. Key modernization projects have faced repeated delays and major strategic missteps — including the government signing off on the sale of a stake in a Hamburg port terminal to Chinese investors — have raised concerns about the country’s ability to counter sophisticated geopolitical adversaries?
Skepticism about rearmament also runs deep, particularly among younger generations with little connection to military service.
Underscoring the urgency of that situation, the coalition has precious little time to deliver on its long to-do list. With German officials warning Russia would be ready for another major war by 2029, Berlin faces a narrowing window in which to translate strategic ambition into real capability — and to establish credible deterrence against a potential Russian attack on another European country.
The stakes could not be higher. Should Germany fail, it risks becoming the weak link in Europe’s security architecture at a moment of growing uncertainty. German Federal Intelligence Service president Bruno Kahl has warned that Germany’s legal and policy framework leaves it lagging behind allies and partners in its ability to respond to evolving security threats.
For now, critical details about Germany’s plans remain unanswered. “The key parameters — the future size of the German armed forces, conscription and the level of defense spending — are not addressed, because no agreement could be reached on these points,” said professor Joachim Krause, director of the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University.
With the US threatening to terminate or roll back its military support for Europe, finding enough troops to deploy to NATO’s eastern flank is one major challenge. Germany has committed 5,000 soldiers to a brigade in Lithuania, and gathering “this amount of personnel quickly is not an easy task,” said Aylin Matle, senior research fellow at the Center for Security and Defense at the German Council on Foreign Relations.
That reflects a deeper problem. The German army has struggled to recruit enough soldiers since halting mandatory military service in 2011. At the end of last year, Germany had a little more than 181,000 troops, a slight decrease from the previous year. Against the advice of many defense experts, the coalition has said it would not reintroduce conscription — “for now.”
Even if it did, public anti-war sentiment could be a serious issue. In a recent FORSA/RTL poll, only one in six Germans — and just 9 percent of young adults aged 18 to 29 — said they would be willing to fight for their country in the event of a serious threat. Moreover, in the most recent federal election, the parties most popular among youths aged 18 to 24 were the Left Party, which staunchly opposes military build-up, and Alternative for Germany, known for its sympathetic stance toward Russia, figures from Forschungsgruppe Wahlen showed.
At the same time, some citizens are stepping forward. Dennis, a 30-year-old entrepreneur from Berlin who asked to go by just his first name out of fear of retaliation against his company, joined the military reserve after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. After just three weeks of training, he became a Jager — among the lowest ranks in the armed forces — and now helps with disaster response while continuing to train.
Dennis grew up in the formerly communist part of Germany, and his parents perceive Russia as very powerful. They were initially alarmed by his decision to enlist, but over time, they have come to understand his motivations, he said. For Dennis, who runs a small business and has planted roots in Berlin, the choice to serve was practical.
“Of course, I’m aware that I could die — but someone has to do it,” he said. “I have a house and a family here, so I couldn’t leave anyway. I might as well make myself useful.”
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