The National Immigration Agency on Tuesday said it had notified some naturalized citizens from China that they still had to renounce their People’s Republic of China (PRC) citizenship. They must provide proof that they have canceled their household registration in China within three months of the receipt of the notice. If they do not, the agency said it would cancel their household registration in Taiwan.
Chinese are required to give up their PRC citizenship and household registration to become Republic of China (ROC) nationals, Mainland Affairs Council Minister Chiu Chui-cheng (邱垂正) said. He was referring to Article 9-1 of the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例), which stipulates that the “people of the Taiwan Area may not have household registrations in the Mainland Area or hold passports issued by the Mainland Area.”
The wording of the act demonstrates the complexity of nationality in Taiwan, which claims all territory currently under the administration of the PRC — and more — but does not automatically grant ROC citizenship to citizens of that territory.
Some parallels could be drawn with residents of Hong Kong. Prior to 1981, Hong Kongers were granted British nationality, a right that was gradually limited prior to the handover to the PRC in 1997 with the establishment of British Dependent Territory and British National (Overseas) citizenships, which provided a separate path to full British nationality.
That situation differed from the circumstances between the PRC and ROC in that Hong Kong had been directly administered by the UK, and the national security risks in granting Hong Kongers British citizenship, such as the threat of infiltration, were not as significant. The UK could also take in a much larger percentage of Hong Kong’s population than Taiwan could absorb of the PRC’s.
Accepting immigrants from the PRC is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it lends legitimacy to the ROC’s sovereignty claims when people give up their PRC citizenship in favor of Taiwanese citizenship. On the other hand, a large influx of Chinese would overwhelm Taiwan’s infrastructure and housing market. Chinese agents could also attempt to infiltrate Taiwan under the guise of seeking asylum. That is likely part of the reason Taipei discourages Chinese from seeking asylum in Taiwan by charging those caught trying to enter the country illegally from China by boat or by swimming ashore.
Adding to the complexity of the situation is that the PRC and ROC do not recognize each other’s sovereignty. That means the requirement for Chinese immigrants to renounce their PRC citizenship is merely a formality, which likely has no practical effect. Even if a Chinese national were to renounce their PRC nationality and obtain ROC citizenship, Chinese authorities would still consider them Chinese, given the PRC’s claims over Taiwan. Reobtaining household registration in China would also be a simple administrative process for anyone whose parents are PRC citizens.
The Taiwanese government might consider renunciation of PRC nationality as a sign of loyalty to the ROC, but Beijing could easily spoof authorities in Taipei by issuing falsified renunciation papers to a Chinese agent.
Taiwan faces a dilemma in how to facilitate the naturalization of PRC nationals, while also protecting national security. For example, how could the government allow a Chinese spouse of a Taiwanese to live in Taiwan, while preventing a loophole that would allow a Chinese agent to come to Taiwan to engage in “united front” activities? This situation led to the deportation of three women last month.
Taiwan must find a way to balance the legitimate rights and interests of the people it has sovereignty over with those of the people it claims — but does not practically have — sovereignty over. The government must create a more effective system to vet Chinese applying for residency, and to assign weights to their applications.
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