After the confrontation between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Friday last week, John Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser, discussed this shocking event in an interview. Describing it as a disaster “not only for Ukraine, but also for the US,” Bolton added: “If I were in Taiwan, I would be very worried right now.”
Indeed, Taiwanese have been observing — and discussing — this jarring clash as a foreboding signal. Pro-China commentators largely view it as further evidence that the US is an unreliable ally and that Taiwan would be better off integrating more deeply into China’s sphere of influence. In contrast, pro-independence journalists and bloggers see it as a reminder that realism shapes diplomacy. They argue that Taiwan must continually prove itself a worthy ally to maintain US support.
I offer two considerations that we must highlight. First, the US’ potential unreliability does not mean China is reliable. Second, while realism is indeed part of diplomacy, what we have witnessed represents a fundamental rupture of the postwar world order that defies explanations based solely on realism.
China has a troubling history of violating agreements it has signed, as seen in its broken commitments regarding Tibet and Xinjiang. More recently, its crackdown on Hong Kong shattered the promise of 50 years of autonomy under the “one country, two systems” framework. Any illusion that Taiwan would fare better than Tibet, Xinjiang or Hong Kong in future “peaceful negotiations” quickly dissolves when placed in this historical context.
For many Taiwanese, the hope has always been to align our values and interests with those of the US — by emphasizing our democratic governance, strategic geopolitical position and top-notch semiconductor industry. This framework could be effective if the US continues to believe that defending the free world is in its national interest. Despite the compromises, failures and self-interest in its foreign affairs record, the US has remained the (flawed) leader of the free world — as long as Americans want to live in a democratic and prosperous world, and believe that their chances of success are higher with strong democratic allies.
We have just experienced a seismic shift in that world order.
Even before last week’s fateful Oval Office encounter, the US joined Russia and China in voting against a UN resolution condemning Russia’s war in Ukraine. Instead, it introduced a separate resolution calling for a swift end to the conflict. However, after European nations amended this US proposal to reaffirm Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the US abstained from voting on its own resolution. These actions marked a significant departure from the US’ traditional foreign policy, a break with decades of bipartisan support for democratic allies. As Russian-American journalist Masha Gessen said, Trump favors a transactional model of raw power — one more akin to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approach.
This shift echoes former US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice’s warning before last year’s US presidential election that Trump might not fully appreciate how much “the world still needs America, and America still needs the world.”
European leaders amplified this concern after the Trump-Zelenskiy fallout. As they rallied behind the Ukrainian president, Europeans wrestled with the thorny question of how to move forward. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas remarked that “the free world needs a new leader,” emphasizing that Europe must now take on this challenge.
It would be unwise for Taiwanese to fail to fully appreciate the implications of this new world order, in which democratic values might no longer secure an ally’s support, and promises made in historic meetings (such as Yalta) or signed security agreements (such as the Budapest Memorandum) could be easily broken. What, then, can we do?
Ukraine’s experience has taught us three key lessons. First, we must strengthen our will and capacity for self-defense. Ukraine would not have lasted this long or received such extensive foreign aid without its people’s courage and ability to resist Russia’s invasion. It is more urgent than ever for Taiwan to increase its national defense budget.
Second, we must develop stronger, more compelling narratives for democracy. Ukraine has done well in reminding the world that it is not just defending its sovereignty, but also protecting the border between Russian aggression and European democracy. Similarly, the histories of Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Yalta and the Budapest Memorandum must not be forgotten. Misinformation — such as claims about who started the war in Ukraine, or whether the People’s Republic of China has ever ruled Taiwan — must be actively challenged.
Finally, while democratic countries (including Ukraine) must work with the Trump administration, it is worth remembering that not all Americans support Trump’s isolationism. Collaborating with US politicians who still believe in the liberal world order might or might not bear fruit, but we must try. At the same time, we should seek and expand realistic opportunities to strengthen ties with other democratic allies, such as Japan, the UK and other European nations.
Staring into the abyss, we might find light. The path ahead is uncertain, but with courage, clarity and hard work to build alliances based on shared values, Taiwan can aspire to remain resilient in this new world order.
Lo Ming-cheng is a professor of sociology at the University of California-Davis, whose research addresses civil society, political cultures and medical sociology.
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