In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or crying wolf.”
No, they are not writing about the current chaos in the Legislative Yuan. They are describing patterns of democratic backsliding in several case studies in Latin America and Europe. However, the similarities are uncanny. If these stories of how democracies die through democratic means seem ominous, they also contain lessons about how to build the necessary guardrails for the survival of democracy.
What could we learn from the challenges faced by other democracies? One key lesson is the importance of informing and engaging the public. Unlike a military coup, the erosion of democratic institutions is gradual and almost imperceptible. To people busy with jobs, parenting and other immediate tasks in daily life, political fights in parliament or between branches of government might seem distant and inconsequential. In a 2011 survey — roughly two years after then-Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez eliminated term limits for the presidency — 51 percent of Venezuelans still rated their country as very democratic, at 8 out 10 or higher. In Taiwan, this political apathy is further exacerbated by the fatigue brought on by the extreme polarization the nation has endured.
There is, therefore, an urgent need to make clear to the public how the controversial bills rushed through by Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) legislators are relevant to their everyday lives. The administration of President William Lai (賴清德) would be well advised to take a much more active leadership role in these communicative efforts than it has thus far.
Explain how these bills threaten to harm our national security and bankrupt our healthcare system. Discuss how the budget cuts supported by opposition legislators would impact government services and public journalism. Post often and widely on social media. Use humor and popular cultural icons (former president Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) “Iron Cat Lady,” the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s “spokesdog” Zongchai (總柴), and former premier Su Tseng-chang’s (蘇貞昌) “we only have one butt” come to mind). I would particularly emphasize reaching out to citizens who self-identify as “apolitical” or “non-partisan,” with the goal of increasing public understanding about how these laws matter, as well as building a broad consensus about defending our ways of life.
It is equally important for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government to refrain from “fighting like they do.” Indeed, the newsfeed in my social media is filled with lamentations from frustrated DPP supporters, calling on the party to take a page from the KMT-TPP playbook: “When the other side fights dirty, we cannot worry about following the rules.”
I understand — and at times even share — the sentiment, but this is the wrong path, as it would further erode the unwritten yet fundamental democratic norms of mutual tolerance and institutional forbearance.
In concrete terms, while DPP officials should absolutely do more to explain why these bills are antidemocratic or difficult to implement, they should avoid name-calling or slandering their opponents. Similarly, Lai and Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) certainly have the right and perhaps even the duty to challenge these bills in the Constitutional Court and, if necessary, refuse to countersign or promulgate antidemocratic or obstructive laws. However, they would be crossing a line if they were to become involved in the mass recall movement targeting KMT legislators.
This perspective might not sit well with some pan-green supporters, many of whom feel we must save our democracy by whatever means necessary, and that talk about democratic norms is lofty and unpragmatic. However, history has taught us that political radicalism often backfires, and whataboutism only alienates moderate voters — both of which would undermine the DPP government’s efforts to communicate with the public about the current crisis, which are too important.
Instead, recall petitions could and should be initiated by civil society groups who find certain legislators to be failing in their duties. Several groups have taken such actions, including the Central Taiwan Association of University Professors. On Sunday, the Liberty Times (Taipei Times’ sister newspaper) reported that a group of long-term KMT members, who self-identified as “the authentic blue army,” have joined the recall petition against a KMT legislator representing a district in Taichung.
Such grassroots efforts at building coalitions across ethnic and ideological divisions are encouraging, but they should be further cultivated, and their base further broadened. Such cross-sectional efforts in civil society represent citizens’ voices rather than specific parties’ agendas, which might be our only chance to stymie spirals of retaliatory actions.
The time is indeed dire. We should be alarmed, but we need not despair. There is still hope if we take timely and thoughtful actions.
Lo Ming-cheng is a professor of sociology at the University of California-Davis, whose research addresses civil society, political cultures and medical sociology.
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