The regime of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad — whose family ruled Syria for half a century — collapsed under continued pressure from rebel forces led by the alliance Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), ending with the panicked al-Assad escaping from Damascus. Given al-Assad’s close relationship with Beijing, the rebel victory might very well impact China.
Located at the end of the Silk Road’s eastern section, Syria historically served as a vital passage for Eastern goods traveling to Europe. On the eve of a coup led by then-Syrian minister of defense Hafez al-Assad in 1969, a Syrian envoy was sent to Beijing. In the midst of the Cultural Revolution, China had implemented a foreign policy of exporting revolution and therefore Chinese leader Mao Zedong (毛澤東) committed to providing Hafez al-Assad with substantial military aid.
After successfully gaining power in 1970, Hafez al-Assad became an important supporter of China in the Middle East. In 2000, after Bashar al-Assad inherited his father’s position, he welcomed the even more rapid development of economic relations with China.
Having spent many years living in the UK, Bashar al-Assad has always admired Western culture, yet he remained deeply cautious about suddenly opening up to the Western market. Therefore, he tried his best to emulate former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s (鄧小平) policy of “reform and opening up.”
Syria in 2006 followed China’s example by implementing its 10th “Five-Year Development Plan,” bringing in substantial Chinese investment. Prior to the outbreak of Syria’s civil war in 2011, China was Syria’s fifth-largest trading partner. After the war began and many nations cut trade relations with Syria, China became Syria’s largest trading partner.
After 2017, as the Syrian military gradually regained control of lost territory, China rapidly increased its investment in Syria. On several occasions, Bashar al-Assad expressed support for Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and welcomed China’s participation in post-war reconstruction plans.
Before the start of the 19th Asian Games in Hangzhou, China, last year, Bashar al-Assad visited China and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) for the first time — he even toured important historic sites across Hangzhou.
Now that the regime of Bashar al-Assad has collapsed, will the interim government recognize previously approved Chinese investment projects? Will it confiscate Chinese assets? These are just two of the unknowns.
Aside from the economic aspect, China’s diplomatic strategy in the Middle East also faces several challenges with the change in Syria. Following the protests, uprisings and armed rebellions of the Arab Spring, the regional system in the Middle East was characterized by the confrontation between Sunni Muslims — led by Saudi Arabia — and Shiite Muslims — led by Iran.
Quite unexpectedly, the rivals came to a mutual agreement under China’s mediation.
The two nations on March 10 last year announced the resumption of diplomatic relations after discussions in Beijing and they even negotiated the formation of a naval alliance in the Persian Gulf, creating a rare, united atmosphere in the Islamic world.
However, HTS forces supported by Saudi Arabia have defeated the Iran-backed regime of Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war. This illustrates that last year’s historic agreement between the two nations might have simply been about China saving face. In reality, both nations still have their own hidden agendas.
Yang Chung-hsin is a civil servant.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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