President William Lai (賴清德) on Sunday started his first overseas trip since taking office in May with a stopover in Hawaii on his way to visit the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and Palau. The president set off on a mission not only to shore up relations with the nation’s three Pacific allies, but also to highlight that Taiwan can be a “force for peace” and is willing to work with like-minded democratic nations against Chinese expansionism in the Asia-Pacific region.
Despite China ramping up efforts to gain influence across the Pacific and entice small nation-states to shift diplomatic allegiances in recent years, the three South Pacific nations recently held major parliamentary elections and retained pro-Taiwan governments. These allies have consistently backed Taiwan in international events, such as the UN and the Pacific Islands Forum, and are expected to continue voicing their support for the nation.
On Tuesday, Marshallese President Hilda Heine welcomed Lai and expressed her government’s commitment to “remain a staunch ally” of Taiwan. The following day, Lai and Tuvaluan Prime Minister Feleti Teo signed a communique to establish more durable and mutual beneficial diplomatic relations. Meanwhile, ahead of his meeting with Lai, Palauan President Surangel Whipps Jr, in a media interview, urged China to respect the sovereignty of the Pacific island nations and their decision to choose their friends. He also slammed Beijing for its “unfriendly behavior,” including launching cyberattacks, naval incursions into Palau’s exclusive economic zone and even firing an intercontinental ballistic missile, without warning, into the Pacific Ocean.
Lai’s overseas trip has demonstrated that his main diplomatic policy would be to prioritize deepening friendships and cooperation with the Pacific allies to withstand China’s threats, and to uphold the shared values of democracy and sovereignty. Instead of setting foot in the continental US like previous presidents, Lai transited through the US state of Hawaii, where the US Indo-Pacific Command is stationed, and the US territory of Guam, a crucial US military base in the Pacific. Right before Lai’s transit, the US Navy deployed a nuclear-powered submarine to the strategic island for the first time in a show of power amid its growing rivalry with China.
Analysts view Lai’s trip as a symbolic and strategic move connecting Taiwan in the first island chain with Palau and Guam in the second island chain, and Hawaii in the third island chain. It is also indicative of Taiwan’s goodwill to align with like-minded democracies, especially the US and Australia, to counter China’s deployment of its Belt and Road Initiative to expand its control in the Pacific region.
During his tour of the Pacific allies, Lai vowed to assist the Marshall Islands to upgrade its national airline’s aging fleet. In Tuvalu, he announced support for the island country to fortify its coast and improve regional connectivity with a new subsea cable jointly funded by Taiwan, the US, Australia and Japan. In Hawaii, he vowed that Taiwan would be a reliable strategic partner and would take proactive actions, through defense and economic strength, to promote peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. In Guam, he was the first Taiwanese president to visit Guam’s legislature and witnessed the passage of a resolution demonstrating a pro-Taiwan stance.
The president also held telephone calls with former US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi on Monday and with incumbent House Speaker Mike Johnson yesterday, both of whom reassured him of the US Congress’ strong bipartisan support for Taiwan amid uncertainty over the incoming administration of US president-elect Donald Trump.
The trip, as expected, has angered China, with experts predicting that it would hold a military exercise around Taiwan. Taiwan needs every bit of international support it can get, and Lai has taken the first step in garnering regional support for the nation.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval
RSS