While the harbor acceptance test (HAT) for Taiwan’s first indigenous submarine prototype the Hai Kun (海鯤) is nearly complete and the vessel is expected to be delivered next year as scheduled, opposition lawmakers have threatened to cut the submarine budget next year, which would delay domestic submarine production for at least two years.
To develop a domestic shipbuilding capability and industry, Taiwan proposed an Indigenous Submarine Program with plans to develop eight indigenous submarines. The Hai Kun was launched in September last year, then started its HAT, which is to be followed by a six-month sea acceptance test scheduled to begin in April next year before the vessel is delivered to the navy in November next year.
Another seven submarines are due to be built in a “two-three-two” production schedule from next year to 2038 at an estimated cost of NT$284 billion (US$8.73 billion). For the next fiscal year, the Ministry of National Defense has budgeted about NT$2 billion for the development of the next two submarines.
Following rumors that the Hai Kun had failed to meet more than 70 HAT metrics, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Legislator Hsu Chiao-hsin (徐巧芯) said that she would propose slashing next year’s budget by NT$1.8 billion, while fellow KMT legislators Huang Ren (黃仁) and Ma Wen-jun (馬文君) have threatened to block the entire budget.
The navy, as the purchaser of the submarines built by CSBC Corp, Taiwan on Monday said that the Hai Kun had completed about 85 percent of the HAT and is expected to be delivered in November next year as scheduled, adding that the tests discovered about a dozen shortcomings that need to be fixed, not 70 items as reported.
Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo (顧立雄) said that if the budget is not allocated this year, the entire schedule for the subsequent submarines would be delayed, costs would very likely rise over time, while the contractors’ confidence in and commitment to the project would likely be damaged.
Compared with the total budget, the NT$2 billion submarine budget listed for the next fiscal year might only be a small portion, but it is definitely a demonstration of Taiwan’s determination to improve its self-defense.
The submarine program, which would strengthen the navy’s capabilities in undersea surveillance and combat, is a vital deterrence against China attempting a maritime invasion of the nation, which it has repeatedly rehearsed, as well as sending ships to test Taiwan’s coastal defenses. The program is also a response to intensifying regional tensions and territorial disputes caused by China in the Taiwan Strait, as well as the rest of the Asia-Pacific region.
Legislators have a duty to oversee the budget and monitor the quality of the submarines being produced by the program, but as more military experts suggest a growing possibility that China would attempt to deploy a maritime blockade of Taiwan, cutting the budget to strengthen the nation’s submarine fleet would scupper the military’s ability to safeguard the nation.
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