It has been nearly a month since Donald Trump’s decisive victory of in the US presidential election, but the result is still sending shockwaves around the world.
States and industries are bracing for Trump’s promised redoubling of protectionist policies.
Cryptocurrency markets were invigorated by the prospect of deregulation. Taiwan, much like other nations facing security threats, is scrambling to grapple with the uncertainty and volatility a Trump administration is known for.
Observers argue over whether Trump’s transactional and “realist” approach is conducive to making Taiwan safer. The general consensus by experts in the field is that Trump would undoubtedly be tough on China, while the support for Taiwan from the US Congress and the Oval Office is firm.
While the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has sought to reassure the public of the stability of US security support, the discourse in Taiwan remains centered on cross-strait security.
A recent poll conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation showed that about 51 percent of respondents were averse to the notion of “paying protection money for US defense,” revealing a slightly ambivalent sentiment.
A mixed sense of cautious skepticism and sometimes cheery optimism has permeated the conversation.
What seems to be missing among this cacophony of national interest dialogue is a broader conversation about democratic values and challenges.
I want to make an argument against Trump beyond the analysis of Taiwan’s national security and trade policies.
At the core of Taiwan’s political debate is the issue of national identity — be it a localized identity of purely pro-independent Taiwanese, pro-”status quo” Republic of China (ROC), or both — which makes it distinct from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) based on Taiwan’s liberalized and democratic system.
The DPP government has stressed its “democratic identity” on the international stage for many years. Concepts such as “like-minded countries” and “value-based diplomacy” were at the core of former president Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) policies, as is the case with President William Lai (賴清德).
Stressing the importance of building a “democratic alliance or relations” is never far from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ agenda.
With China’s incessant pressure to push Taiwan out of any international space, Taiwan’s competitiveness and power come not from its size or military strength, but from its specialized industry, like semiconductors, and the soft power garnered through its democratic affinity. For years, the democratic legacy of Taiwan not only informed a national identity that gravitated away from authoritarianism, but also molded an approach to foreign policy that aligned with the liberal international order.
Recently, Taiwan has faced numerous challenges to its democracy in the form of an overreaching legislative majority. From amendments to expand the legislature’s power in May this year to attempts to boycott crucial political nominations, such as to the Examination Yuan, by refusing to proceed with confirmation hearings, the opposition parties have sought to obstruct the ability of the ruling party to govern effectively.
Civil movements against these blatant legislative overreaches have had tremendous momentum. The “Blue Bird” movement reportedly drew 100,000 people outside the legislature in Taipei in a robust protest against new legislation that would later be ruled mostly unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.
This month, Taiwan’s lawyers organized and spoke out against a legislative proposal that would essentially cripple the Constitutional Court’s ability to function should the legislative majority simply refuse to consider any nominees.
The many troubles that Taiwan’s democracy faces do not strictly contravene any laws or regulations. The legislative majority is acting well within its legal prerogatives to legislate and set legislative agendas.
However, liberal democratic principles demand more than mere adherence to the law from politicians. There are normative practices, such as the willingness to negotiate with the opposition, and respect for the system of checks and balances.
There are two main forms of this particular type of stealth democratic backsliding, which erodes democracy in spirit if not substantively. One is seeking to change the rules of the game, like how the legislative majority is trying to modify electoral and procedural rules that would empower itself above the other branches of government. The other is bending the norms of democracy, like forgoing party negotiations and substantive deliberation completely in pursuit of legislative goals.
Trump, however hawkish his administration might be on China, is a political figure who is more than willing to engage in this type of political maneuvering. Under his directives, the Republican Party’s US Senate majority in 2017 dismantled the filibuster for US Supreme Court nominees to push through Trump’s nominee, Neil Gorsuch. The filibuster, whatever its implications are for popular democracy, is a long-standing procedural mechanism that induces bipartisanship within the US Senate. By ridding the system of its check on majority power, the Senate majority now holds the power to confirm nominees without bipartisan support.
As for bending the norms, Trump is known to be a serial norm breaker. He appointed and is poised to appoint personal lawyers to key positions in the US Department of Justice. Disregarding the common practice of avoiding conflicts of interest, he interfered with FBI investigations by dismissing its director, James Comey, and threatened to fire then-US special counsel Robert Mueller who was investigating potential Russian interference in the 2016 election, an infringement on independent agencies.
Finally, he purposefully excluded media outlets he deemed unfavorable to him from attending numerous White House news conferences, undermining the expected professional transparency a democratic executive ought to have.
With Trump set to retake office, he is already pressuring Republican senators to approve his Cabinet nominees during the Senate recess so they do not have to go through the usual confirmation process. Even when his party holds the majority to confirm their preferred nominees, Trump is trying to bend norms to further reduce any potential check on his power.
The Lai administration’s prudence in dealing with its most important security partner is commendable and reasonable. Nevertheless, the parallel between Trump and the democratic erosions Taiwan now faces domestically is a cogent one. Outside the cordiality that state-level relations demand, those who prize Taiwan’s democratic values and principles ought to caution against a US president who tramples on democratic institutions repeatedly.
Those who take pride in Taiwan’s hard-earned democratization must keep in mind that the reason Taiwan has aligned itself with the broader Western world is precisely because it hopes to work with other states that share its democratic vision.
Lee Chi-en is pursuing a master’s degree in international studies at National Chengchi University. His research focuses on democratic backsliding and legislative politics. He was also a Ministry of Foreign Affairs youth ambassador in 2019.
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