For most of its history, Pakistan has been ruled by military dictators. Brief democratic intervals were only possible because the military became so hugely unpopular that it was left with no other option than to temporarily cede space to democracy.
The last military dictator was forced to quit in 2008, and Pakistan has since seen the longest spell of civilian control in its history.
Instead of moving forward, it has slid backward, and was downgraded last year from a “hybrid” to an “authoritarian” regime. Its electoral process and its democracy have lost all credibility — not only in the eyes of ordinary Pakistanis, but in the eyes of the world.
We did not get here overnight. In Ernest Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises, one character asks another: “How did you go bankrupt?” and gets the famed reply: “Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.”
In the past decade or so, all major political parties in Pakistan have participated in the gradual decline of its democracy. In their lust for power, they have conspired with the military, using its influence to manipulate elections and crush political opponents.
In doing so, they have helped to undermine the rule of law, democratic norms and the country’s Constitution.
The past two elections were marred by glaring irregularities. Instead of settling political disputes, they exacerbated them.
Those held in 2018 brought former Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan to power and caused huge controversy, and those held this year denied him power arbitrarily.
In 2018, Khan counted the military as an ally; by this year it had become a foe. Now Khan is exactly where his opponents were a few years ago: in jail, waiting for the tide to turn. If history is an example, the tide would surely turn at some point for Khan, as it did for his opponents.
The larger question is why the military is allowed to choose who gets to run Pakistan. For now, political leaders and parties seem uninterested in asking, let alone resolving this question. Politics has been reduced to a pick me, love me, choose me affair.
As a result, various worrying trends are surfacing in the country. The state has been cracking down on dissent, attempting to decimate Khan’s party and recently taking the decision to ban the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, a peaceful organization that has long championed the rights of the country’s ethnic Pashtuns.
Meanwhile, the government has been slow to condemn recent killings in police custody.
Last month, two citizens were killed in custody after facing accusations of blasphemy. There has been no discussion of what might have sparked these killings — and whether growing religious radicalization has played a part.
When the focus of politics shifts from the welfare of citizens and morphs into an elite power struggle, ordinary people are the biggest losers. This cycle of political instability has injured Pakistan’s economy, causing capital flight, while 12.5 million more people have slipped below the poverty line.
The number of children now out of school has increased drastically to 25.3 million, which amounts to more than one-third of children aged between five and 16. Budgetary allocations for education and health remain dismally low.
Last month, the country entered the 25th IMF bailout program in its history. While this has prevented Pakistan from defaulting on its sovereign debt, it has also involved a number of reforms — such as privatizing loss-making state enterprises, and raising taxes — that are so unpopular previous governments avoided taking them out of fear of a public backlash.
Economic stability is built on political stability, yet rather than easing political tensions, the government has inflamed them.
Last week, it rushed through a controversial amendment that would give it more control over the appointment of judges in the Supreme Court of Pakistan and high courts of Pakistan, without any debate.
This came under severe criticism at home and abroad, with the International Commission of Jurists and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk branding this as an attempt to undermine the independence of the judiciary.
I am afraid the situation on the international front is as bleak as that back home. Since the withdrawal of the US and the Taliban’s subsequent takeover of Kabul, thousands of Pakistani civilians and members of the security forces have been killed in terrorist attacks orchestrated by the radical Taliban offshoot Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TPP).
The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is souring and has the potential to unravel completely. For years, the security apparatus in Pakistan ignored calls that cautioned it against treating the Taliban as an ally. It looked the other way as the Taliban built sanctuaries in Pakistani tribal areas, betting that the Taliban would take control of Afghanistan as soon as the US retreated. It has radically underestimated the risks.
Far from being an ally, the Taliban want to expand the Islamic emirate, and the TTP’s stated goal is to overthrow Pakistan’s Constitution and government.
Mistakes and follies have a way of catching up with people at the worst possible time. Pakistan could go two ways from here. The government could change tack and run the country according to the wishes of the public, as expressed through free and fair elections. Or it could risk crossing the invisible line between the gradual and the sudden.
Its future hangs in an equal balance, between democracy and implosion.
Mustafa Nawaz Khokhar is a former senator in Pakistan. From 2009 to 2013, he served as the adviser to the prime minister of Pakistan on human rights.
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