The inauguration of Prabowo Subianto as Indonesia’s eighth president on Oct. 20 marks the official beginning of his “good neighbor” foreign policy. He aims to maintain a delicate balance among major powers, while fostering collaboration to achieve peace and stability, and bolster economic cooperation with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. How does Taiwan fit into Prabowo’s foreign policy agenda?
Taiwan is significant for Indonesia due to its role in hosting a substantial number of Indonesian migrant workers. Under his new Cabinet, “merah putih” (“red and white”), Prabowo has established a ministry dedicated to protecting migrant workers. He upgraded the status of the Indonesian Migrant Worker Protection Agency to ministerial level, separated from the Indonesian Ministry of Manpower.
Under the new ministry, Indonesia is expected to enhance migrant worker protection diplomacy with migrant-receiving countries, especially Taiwan.
Despite being the second-most favored destination for Indonesian migrant workers, Taiwan has remained a blind spot in Jakarta’s protection diplomacy agenda. The absence of official diplomatic relations prevents high-level bilateral labor talks between the two presidents, which are essential for demonstrating the moral commitment of the state to migrant workers.
For example, former Indonesian president Joko Widodo last year met with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim to discuss migrant worker issues. Such official dialogue between Indonesia and Taiwan is unlikely due to Jakarta’s “one China” policy.
Prabowo’s interest in enhancing the protection of migrant workers in Taiwan is closely tied to the fact that these workers constituted the largest overseas voting bloc for him during the February presidential election, accounting for 80 percent. That makes it paramount for him to return the political favor by enhancing the protection of migrant workers. Improving the security of migrant workers in Taiwan is pertinent to Indonesia, especially with the increasing geopolitical tensions across the Taiwan Strait that risk the lives of the workers should China attack Taiwan.
The failure to protect migrant workers in Taiwan would undermine Prabowo’s legitimacy. These workers play a crucial role as primary breadwinners for their families in Indonesia and vital contributors to the national economy through foreign remittances. As such, Indonesia and Taiwan are expected to establish a “Track II dialogue” to address the stability across the Taiwan Strait and maintain the “status quo.”
Other areas which Taiwan can potentially benefit from Indonesia’s new administration are trade and the digital economy. The appointment of Budi Santoso, the former head of the Indonesian Economic and Trade Office to Taipei, as minister of trade signals the significance of Taiwan as a key trading partner. During his tenure, Santoso promoted Indonesia’s export commodities and explored business and trading opportunities between Indonesia and Taiwan, especially in the agriculture sector, in which Taiwan is leading.
Furthermore, Santoso also praised Taiwan’s advanced technology, which can help Indonesia develop its digital economy. His familiarity and experience with Taiwan are expected to further enhance bilateral trade and economic cooperation, particularly in advancing the stalled proposal of a bilateral economic cooperation arrangement between the countries.
A recent public and elite perception survey issued by Indikator Politik Indonesia, an Indonesia-based research institute, showed that Indonesia should enhance cooperation in culture, tourism and creative industries with Taiwan. In the early 2000s, Taiwanese pop culture dominated Indonesian television thanks to the popularity of the Taiwanese television drama Meteor Garden (流星花園). The iconic bubble milk tea has also leveraged Taiwan’s soft power diplomacy.
As Taiwan prepares to launch the “New Southbound Policy+” under President William Lai (賴清德), it is essential to consider the digital economy and creative industries as crucial components of Taiwan’s economic and soft power diplomacy with Indonesia. The initiative should come together with the proposal to expand Taiwan’s semiconductor network in Southeast Asia. Indonesia has shown interest in attracting semiconductor investment, particularly given the country’s abundant tin and nickel production, which can shore up the global supply chain of chip industries.
The formation of Indonesia’s National Economic Council also signifies Prabowo’s foreign policy priority in achieving economic resilience, which Taiwan can contribute to through economic and labor diplomacy.
Ratih Kabinawa is an adjunct research fellow at the University of Western Australia and a Ministry of Foreign Affairs visiting research fellow.
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