Former president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) this week attended the Forum 2000 Conference in Prague after landing in the Czech Republic, the first destination of her first overseas trip since concluding her second term in office in May.
The country is not a surprising choice. Taiwan-Czech relations have taken a great leap forward, since Czech prime minister Andrej Babis’ administration from 2017 to 2021. Huge progress was made during Tsai’s time in office.
Her trip was intended to express Taiwan’s gratitude to the Czech Republic, while also achieving two diplomatic goals.
The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) empty promises on its Belt and Road Initiative have contributed to closer ties between Taipei and Prague.
Then-minister of foreign affairs Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) and then-legislative speaker You Si-kun (游錫?) visited the Czech Republic between 2021 and last year, while Czech Chamber of Deputies Speaker Marketa Pekarova Adamova led a delegation of nearly 150 members to Taiwan last year.
Bilateral trade grew 36 percent from 2020 to last year, and the Czech Republic was Taiwan’s fourth-largest investment destination in Europe.
The countries’ friendship received a boost when then-Prague mayor Zdenek Hrib, a member of the Czech Pirate Party, signed a sister-city agreement with Taipei after scrapping a similar agreement with Beijing in 2019.
The CCP had reportedly pressured then-Czech senate president Jaroslav Kubera over his planned visit to Taiwan. Kubera died from a heart attack days before the trip. His family blamed his death on the Chinese embassy in Prague who tried to dissuade him from the trip. After Milos Vystrcil became senate president in February 2020, he met Tsai in Taipei in August that same year.
In January last year, then-president-elect Czech President Petr Pavel became the first European leader to have a direct telephone conversation with Tsai.
The Czech government supported Taiwan during Tsai’s presidency. Relations between the countries have progressed since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is reasonable for Tsai to choose Prague to start her diplomatic trip after leaving office.
While the CCP’s military drills, code-named “Joint Sword-2024B,” were widely reported by international news outlets, it could not be timelier for Tsai to give a speech in Prague emphasizing that Taiwan is at the front line of authoritarianism, facing the CCP’s threats, and that the country must work with like-minded allies to safeguard regional security, and resist coercion and intimidation.
The international community would sympathize with Taiwan. The Czech Republic can understand the severity of an authoritarian regime after living under the Soviet Union while a part of Czechoslovakia.
The largest opposition party, ANO 2011 — which prioritizes economic benefits, and is pro-Russia, anti-immigrant and anti-EU — has made a comeback. ANO 2011, led by Babis, won the most seats in the European Parliament election in June and Czech’s regional elections last month. The pro-Taiwan Czech Pirate Party quit the ruling coalition after significant losses in the regional elections.
Tsai’s visit can strengthen bonds between the two nations and support the Czech Republic’s ruling coalition. As Tsai has said, Taiwan’s democratization process was similar to that of Eastern Europe. Both countries had seen champions of democracy sacrifice themselves to resist dictatorial rule. That shared experience could unite the countries and sustain mutually beneficial ties.
Chang Meng-jen is chair of Fu Jen Catholic University’s Department of Italian Language and Culture and coordinator of the university’s diplomacy and international affairs program.
Translated by Fion Khan
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