To the dismay of the Chinese propaganda machine, President William Lai (賴清德) has been mounting an information offensive through his speeches. No longer are Taiwanese content with passively reacting to China’s encroachment in the international window of discourse, but Taiwan is now setting the tone and pace of conversation.
Last month, Lai’s statement that “If China wants Taiwan it should also take back land from Russia” made international headlines, pointing out the duplicity of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) revanchism.
History shows that the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) stance on regional territorial disputes has not been consistent. The early CCP had recognized Taiwan as a distinct nation and former Chinese leader Mao Zedong (毛澤東) even supported Taiwanese independence. During the Cold War, the CCP viewed Bhutan and parts of Nepal as falling within its borders. Following the Sino-Soviet split, the CCP “firmly support[ed] the just struggle of the Japanese people to recover the northern territories [Kuril Islands]” from the Soviet Union. Territorial issues and these grand historical claims must be viewed as shifting political means for the CCP to legitimize its claim to power.
Speaking at the Double Ten National Day gala on Saturday, Lai said: “It is impossible for the People’s Republic of China [PRC] to be the Republic of China’s [ROC] motherland,” as the ROC is older than the PRC.
Nevertheless, in contrast to Lai’s consistency in highlighting Taiwan’s legitimacy and self-determination, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) remains in a state of helpless malaise. During a time of heightened tension due to China’s aggressive gray-zone tactics, KMT Legislator-at-large Weng Hsiao-ling (翁曉玲) said that “the peaceful unification of this country is of course our ultimate goal” and “urged [Lai] to resist US ‘pressure’ on Taiwan to boost military spending.”
Weng is willfully ignorant of the changing tides of international politics and the real threats posed by the PRC. Furthermore, she is helping China’s cognitive warfare at a time when Taiwan needs strategic clarity. Knowing the recent developments in Hong Kong, can Weng even imagine a democratic Taiwan under Xi? The PRC, a Leninist state of control, characteristically does not allow any bottom-up reimagination of the state, like the one Weng is hinting at. A dictatorship of the proletariat is not compatible with popular sovereignty envisioned by Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙) in 1924, nor with modern Taiwan’s growing sense of progressive national identity. Weng’s KMT-flavored romance of unification is a relic of the past and should have been abandoned decades ago.
On the one hand, the KMT and its pan-blue pundits are spreading US-skepticism and echoing pro-China talking points. On the other hand, the KMT is also reassuring US policymakers that it takes national security seriously. Which one is the real KMT? Will the KMT continue to stall Taiwan’s defense buildup? Does it genuinely believe that cross-strait dialogue alone will stop conflict?
Lai has not ruled out dialogue with China. Beijing has yet to respond. However, in April, KMT caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) led a delegation of 17 KMT lawmakers to Beijing to discuss cross-strait ties. The content and results of these talks still remain unclear, but one thing is for certain: China has not stopped sending its warplanes and warships around Taiwan’s airspace and waters. In times like this, strategic clarity and unity are desperately needed. Taiwan must realize that there is a new Cold War and prepare accordingly.
Linus Chiou is a graduate student at National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University.
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