The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) has disingenuously attempted to compare its chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) with former South African president Nelson Mandela, framing a narrative for Ko’s arrest by saying that “the Democratic Progressive Party [DPP] is oppressing A-bei [Ko],” and that “the international community will not stand for it.”
However, nobody in the international community has expressed support for Ko, with the exception of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
During its first regular press conference for the summer, which it dedicated to Ko’s plight, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) accused the DPP government of conducting a campaign of “green terror” and oppressing anyone who did not agree with “Taiwan separatism.”
Furthermore, the TAO said that polling in Taiwan is concealing the truth.
The TAO is a foreign government organization more than 1,720km away from the Taipei District Prosecutors’ Office, and yet it claims to have insider knowledge of the ongoing legal case. This is utterly absurd. Has Interpol considered moving its headquarters to Taiwan yet?
After Chinese officials proclaimed their “strong support for Ko,” Hong Kong-based news outlet China Review News Agency put out two opinion articles in quick succession.
The first article said the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was “being wishy-washy in voicing its support for Ko, and that it was missing a great opportunity.”
The second article called for the KMT and the TPP to “safeguard opposition party cooperation as a means of fighting the ‘green terror.’”
These two articles were published after the TAO made its statement. They are clear in showing that “backing Ko” is the real impetus for the CCP in this whole saga.
The CCP has already decided to “make Ko one of their own,” acknowledging that the TPP “has value” as useful idiots. The CCP does not want its fledgling “blue-white [KMT-TPP] coalition” to die an early death.
Even for those in the minority, such as TPP Legislator Chen Chao-tzu (陳昭姿), Ko is still a “deep green-leaning politician.”
Yet Ko’s positions on national sovereignty and cross-strait relations have apparently long been separate from the general view of the TPP.
Ko has several dubious and colorful expressions, including his statement in May 2015 that “one China is not the problem,” his description of Chinese and Taiwanese in August 2015 as being “one family on two sides of the [Taiwan] Strait,” the absolute gem from October 2018 that “Taiwan is just a pawn of the US” and his statement in October last year in the run-up to this year’s general election that “I would not completely refuse the ‘1992 consensus.’”
Not only do such proclamations fully align with the CCP’s ideology that “both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to China. We are opposed to Taiwan separatists and foreign interlopers,” Ko’s statements allow the CCP to continue to breathe life into its shambling puppet in Taiwan, the KMT. The CCP sees a new milestone in its war to annex Taiwan through a “cooperative partner” in the TPP.
The CCP’s “united front” is targeting the DPP and would not refrain from interfering in Taiwanese politics with its foreign proclamations. It is gunning for a blue-white coalition.
After Ma Ying-jeou [馬英九] Foundation director Hsiao Hsu-tsen (蕭旭岑) went on a special trip to China last year, former president Ma rushed to “head to the mountains” to act as part-time referee for a KMT-TPP coalition working group.
China Review News Agency pleaded several times that the KMT and TPP “join hands to monitor the DPP.” They also wanted KMT caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) to “abolish the Anti-Infiltration Act [反滲透法].”
This is why Beijing is enthusiastic about a blue-white coalition and wants to continue manipulating the KMT and the TPP into impeding the DPP from leading Taiwan. The CCP wants to advance the establishment of a pro-China administration in Taiwan to make annexation all the more easier.
The CCP still needs the TPP’s sustained cooperation “to make friends with those who want to move Taiwan closer to China and oppose the green camp.” After all, it is difficult for the CCP to rely solely on the KMT to achieve its goals. The CCP has little choice but to support Ko if it wants to realize its annexation goal.
However, when the day comes that Ko’s “collapsing facade” causes Taiwan’s political centrists and young voters to look at supporting other candidates and parties, symbolizing the TPP’s devolution into a spent force, the CCP might withdraw all its “care and concern” and “betrothal pledges” to the KMT and the TPP.
I hope the TPP does not keel over and sink into the melodramatic romantic-comedy waters of “international [Chinese] concerns.” It should not forget that love from Beijing is a fickle, bitter thing — the reality of Beijing’s “love” is a matter of brutality.
Jethro Wang is a former secretary at the Mainland Affairs Council.
Translated by Tim Smith
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
RSS