Last month, a snap general election in the UK saw the ruling Conservative Party defeated and the Labour Party take power for the first time since 2010. With this change, there is now a fresh opportunity for the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) under new leadership to chart a new course on relations with Taiwan that identifies and responds to the shifting cross-strait dynamics, balance of power and now almost fluid “cross-strait status quo.”
The Taiwan Policy Centre monitors all mentions of Taiwan in the UK parliament on the In Westminster section of our Web site. In November, then-shadow foreign secretary David Lammy asked the government what steps had the government taken to help prevent the possibility of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
This was the reply: “The UK has a clear interest in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. We consider the Taiwan issue one to be settled peacefully by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait through constructive dialogue, without the threat or use of force or coercion. China’s continued military flights near Taiwan are part of an ongoing pattern of escalatory activity and are not conducive to peace and stability. We do not support any unilateral attempts to change the status quo, including increased Chinese assertiveness toward Taiwan.”
If the first two sentences of the answer came from an FCDO template used for many decades, the later comments showed some promising signs of recognizing that the People’s Republic of China (PRC), not Taiwan, is the source of provocation and tension across the Strait. Nevertheless, the Taiwan Policy Centre feels this does not go far enough. In our report “Respecting Taiwan,” we argued for the UK government to change its approach, updating a policy that has effectively been covered in diplomatic cobwebs since the UK first recognized the PRC in 1950.
We proposed a new statement to signal a more proactive and assertive UK foreign policy toward Taiwan: “The United Kingdom recognizes that Taiwan has a complex historical relationship with its neighbors, which has left a number of unresolved cultural, legal and constitutional legacies. The United Kingdom respects the right of the Taiwanese people under international law to self-determination and believes that the future of Taiwan is a matter for the Taiwanese people alone to decide without bribe, threat or coercion from any other party. The United Kingdom does not rule out providing assistance to Taiwan in the event that it is subject to an attempted invasion or other serious hostile assault. The nature of this assistance will be proportionate to the severity of the threat, and coordinated in conjunction with allied nations in the region. We expect all parties to uphold international law, abide by UNCLOS [UN Convention on the Law of the Sea] and other relevant treaties, and resolutely reject adventurism or the escalation of tensions.”
We now call upon the new foreign secretary, Lammy, and Prime Minister Keir Starmer to recognize that the so-called “status quo” has already been fundamentally altered by the PRC’s daily threatening incursions in Taiwan’s air defense identification zone and the “circling” of the country with military assets.
The PRC’s demand that officials working in Taiwan Representative Offices in Macau and Hong Kong now sign statements recognizing Taiwan as a part of the PRC are one more part of the PRC’s salami slicing of the status quo. It is time for the UK to evolve its position to match the new reality of Taiwan-China relations, bring it in line with international law, show respect and recognition of Taiwanese democracy, self-determination and sovereignty, and show the PRC that UK foreign policy is made in London, not Beijing.
Ben Goren is director of communications for the Taiwan Policy Centre and a long-term resident of Taiwan.
The government and local industries breathed a sigh of relief after Shin Kong Life Insurance Co last week said it would relinquish surface rights for two plots in Taipei’s Beitou District (北投) to Nvidia Corp. The US chip-design giant’s plan to expand its local presence will be crucial for Taiwan to safeguard its core role in the global artificial intelligence (AI) ecosystem and to advance the nation’s AI development. The land in dispute is owned by the Taipei City Government, which in 2021 sold the rights to develop and use the two plots of land, codenamed T17 and T18, to the
US President Donald Trump has announced his eagerness to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un while in South Korea for the APEC summit. That implies a possible revival of US-North Korea talks, frozen since 2019. While some would dismiss such a move as appeasement, renewed US engagement with North Korea could benefit Taiwan’s security interests. The long-standing stalemate between Washington and Pyongyang has allowed Beijing to entrench its dominance in the region, creating a myth that only China can “manage” Kim’s rogue nation. That dynamic has allowed Beijing to present itself as an indispensable power broker: extracting concessions from Washington, Seoul
Taiwan’s labor force participation rate among people aged 65 or older was only 9.9 percent for 2023 — far lower than in other advanced countries, Ministry of Labor data showed. The rate is 38.3 percent in South Korea, 25.7 percent in Japan and 31.5 percent in Singapore. On the surface, it might look good that more older adults in Taiwan can retire, but in reality, it reflects policies that make it difficult for elderly people to participate in the labor market. Most workplaces lack age-friendly environments, and few offer retraining programs or flexible job arrangements for employees older than 55. As
Donald Trump’s return to the White House has offered Taiwan a paradoxical mix of reassurance and risk. Trump’s visceral hostility toward China could reinforce deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Yet his disdain for alliances and penchant for transactional bargaining threaten to erode what Taiwan needs most: a reliable US commitment. Taiwan’s security depends less on US power than on US reliability, but Trump is undermining the latter. Deterrence without credibility is a hollow shield. Trump’s China policy in his second term has oscillated wildly between confrontation and conciliation. One day, he threatens Beijing with “massive” tariffs and calls China America’s “greatest geopolitical