US President Joe Biden’s historic decision on July 21 to take his name out of the running for a second term has upended expectations for this year’s presidential election in the US.
A listlessness regarding a rematch of the same two candidates from four years ago has transformed into an explosion of excitement around US Vice President Kamala Harris as the presumptive Democratic nominee. Within days and even hours, record-breaking donations flowed into the Harris campaign’s coffers, while memes about coconuts and Harris being “brat” flooded social media. What seemed to be an uphill battle for Democrats less than two weeks ago now feels like a win might be within grasp.
However, many uncertainties remain about what a Harris presidency might look like. Crucially for Taiwan, one of the biggest question marks is about her foreign policy.
Most of Harris’ career was spent as an attorney in California, followed by four years in the US Senate before being sworn in as vice president in 2021. In the Senate, she served on committees on the budget, homeland security, intelligence and the judiciary, focused primarily on domestic issues. As vice president, her biggest portfolios have been on the southern border and abortion. While she has attended international events, her remarks have toed the line of the Biden administration, offering little insight into her personal views.
Yet the little she has said about Taiwan and China has been clear. In Japan on Sept. 28, 2022, Harris said that the US would “continue to support Taiwan’s self-defense consistent with our long-standing policy” and continue to deepen unofficial ties. She praised Taiwan as a “vibrant democracy that contributes to the global good.” Considering the consistency of Democratic messaging on Taiwan, there is little to suggest that she would stray from this boilerplate rhetoric and would likely continue the steady push for closer ties of the past two administrations.
One thing she has been relatively vocal about is human rights. In 2019, she cosponsored the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in support of protesters and has condemned China’s treatment of Uighurs. Harris said in response to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington last week that she “will not be silent” in response to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. These, in addition to her background as a prosecutor and impassioned advocacy for abortion rights, seem to suggest that human rights will be a major priority in her foreign policy. If this is the case, then supporting Taiwan and its international participation is a good way to demonstrate these credentials.
On the other hand, it is not clear what a second term for former US president Donald Trump would mean for Taiwan. He won many friends for taking a telephone call from then-president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) in 2016 and for forceful rhetoric on China, and his administration was staffed with staunch China hawks. Yet he seems to have had a change of heart, saying in a Bloomberg Businessweek interview this month that Taiwan should pay the US for its security and accusing it of stealing the US’ semiconductor industry. His economic proposal to impose 10 percent tariffs on imports across the board would also deal a huge blow to Taiwan’s export-centered economy, not to mention the shockwaves it would send across the global system.
Whatever happens in the US election in November, it is sure to have significant implications for Taipei. If the past two weeks have shown anything, it is that things can change fast. Policymakers in Taiwan and their friends in Washington should stay sharp and be nimble to respond to any possibility, including the chance of a Harris presidency.
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