Taiwanese are on the streets protesting what is viewed as a power grab by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), attempting to concentrate power in the legislature, where it and other opposition lawmakers have a combined majority, at the expense of the executive, blurring the lines between the legislative and judicial branches of government in the process.
It is not just that opposition parties are, in the words of the Taiwan Bar Association, failing to “substantively discuss or review the four bills before it,” but that these developments are taking place in a context in which China is threatening Taiwan, while KMT politicians appear indifferent, or worse, seem to be working with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to hobble William Lai’s (賴清德) presidency.
Concerns have been raised that the measures, which would grant legislators new prosecutorial powers to compel ministers to be questioned, and be found in “contempt of the legislature” if they decline, could be used to politically target individuals.
As Michael Fahey, an expert on Taiwan’s laws told Nikkei Asia: “The KMT is eager to start ‘show trials’ in the legislature exposing alleged systemic corruption by Lai and his allies. Renewable energy projects will be the main target, but they will also almost certainly go after the submarine program.”
This has worrying implications for Taiwan’s much-needed defense reforms. The development of the indigenously built submarines was only possible due to the secrecy of the project, where Taiwan was able to work with experts from seven states, including the UK, which Reuters said approved multiple export licenses for British companies to supply crucial submarine technology and software to Taiwan. The submarine program and all future programs like it could be in jeopardy if the KMT passes this legislation.
The KMT appears to seek to reverse the defense reforms implemented by former president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文). Many in the KMT did not support the extension of mandatory military service, nor the development of the nation’s indigenous weapons programs and transition to an asymmetric “porcupine” defense strategy, which the US and other partners say is essential to deter a Chinese attack.
KMT Legislator Ma Wen-chun (馬文君) described the subs as “undersea coffins.” Ma has served on the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee since 2020, and during the last legislative session, filed 135 motions to reduce the defense budget by NT$180 million (US$5.58 million), freeze NT$1.29 billion and take away NT$300 million from the submarine program. Despite allegations that she passed secretive information about the program to South Korea and China, the KMT still nominated her as committee convener for the new legislative session.
Like Ma, many in the KMT have huge misgivings about the direction and orientation of Taiwan’s defense policy under Tsai. They see the nation’s accumulation of hard power as “provoking” Beijing, ultimately making Taiwan less safe. They believe it is naive to think that Taiwan can resist China, and that the only way to secure the nation’s security and prosperity is by providing Beijing with more “assurances” than the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) has done. In practice, this could mean arresting defense spending, winding down weapons development, working less with the US and drawing closer to China.
It is in this national security context that Taiwanese are protesting. The KMT, in its rush to placate Beijing and go after the DPP, is failing to assure the public and civil society that it can be trusted to defend Taiwan against Beijing’s encroachment.
As in 2014 with the Sunflower movement and a similar KMT “black box” treatment of legislation with national security implications, what is at stake is about more than legislative proprietary, it is the survival of Taiwan’s democracy. The stakes could not be higher.
KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) recent visit to Beijing and her upcoming visit to Washington will serve as a high-level test of her diplomatic mettle. In Beijing, Cheng was received with symbolic gestures, a warm reception, and high-level access. In Washington, she will receive far less pomp and far sharper questions about the KMT’s vision for the future of Taiwan. Her challenge will be to persuade Washington that the KMT’s engagement with China can coexist with strong deterrence. Cheng’s April 7-12 visit to mainland China coincided with an intense period of conflict in Iran. Despite the strategic significance of Cheng’s trip,
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has sent the vast Asian chemicals industry into a tailspin. Deprived of the likes of Qatari natural gas and Saudi Arabian oil, the region’s fertilizer and plastics plants are slowing production or even shutting down. Everywhere except China, that is. In petrochemicals, China is unique. As well as a traditional industry that uses oil and gas as feedstock, it has parallel output that relies on its abundant domestic coal. Unsurprisingly, India and other regional powers want to copy and paste the Chinese method. This would not be easy — or climate friendly. The
US President Donald Trump recently repeated his claim that “Taiwan stole America’s chip industry,” reigniting public debate on the issue. As a former Taiwanese minister of economic affairs and an entrepreneur deeply involved in semiconductor supply chain development, I feel a responsibility to clarify this misunderstanding. From the perspective of global industrial evolution and the economic principle of comparative advantage, such a statement appears overly simplistic and risks obscuring the essence of the issue. The rise of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry was not built on “replacing America,” but rather emerged as a result of countries pursuing different development paths within the
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto says he knows how to fix the problems facing Indonesia. Yet his economic mismanagement and authoritarian tendencies are steering the nation toward a familiar mix of currency instability and political chaos. The world’s fourth-most populous nation risks reversing the hard-won democratic and business reforms that came after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. At that time, the rupiah collapsed and the political upheaval that followed forced former president Haji Mohamed Suharto from power. Prabowo’s administration is ignoring similar warning signs. That disconnect was apparent in a national address on Wednesday, when Prabowo projected the swagger that has
RSS