With each passing day, the threat of a People’s Republic of China (PRC) assault on Taiwan grows. Whatever one’s view about the history, there is essentially no question that a PRC conquest of Taiwan would mark the end of the autonomy and freedom enjoyed by the island’s 23 million people. Simply put, the PRC threat to Taiwan is genuinely existential for a free, democratic and autonomous Taiwan.
Yet one might not know it from looking at Taiwan. For an island facing a threat so acute, lethal and imminent, Taiwan is showing an alarming lack of urgency in dramatically strengthening its defenses. This is incredibly dangerous because the fate of Taiwan depends on the military defensibility of the island. It will ultimately be military power that will deter and, if necessary, defeat a PRC invasion of Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will not be stopped by hashtags and good wishes from afar. Yet in August last year, Taiwan announced plans to spend just US$19 billion on defense — a measly 2.5 percent of the island’s GDP. While it is true that Taiwan has made some progress, for instance in adopting an asymmetric approach to its defense, its spending and pace of preparations have been woefully inadequate given the awing scale of China’s military buildup.
Even worse, there are concerns about how serious Taiwan really is about the threat. There are few visible indicators of a society preparing to repel an attack as one might see in, say, Israel. Indeed, Taiwanese leaders often appear more concerned about advertising their concern for the plight of others than about ensuring their own defenses, arguing, for example, that “the defense of Ukraine is also the defense of Taiwan.”
What might be causing Taiwan to be adopting this lackluster approach towards defense? Let’s examine the possibilities to see why they are all deeply unwise and ill-founded.
First, Taiwan may believe that it is already doing enough to protect its people and deter China. But let’s put things in context. China’s official defense budget is about 12 times more than what Taiwan spends. Some US government estimates put China’s actual defense spending at about $700 billion — about three times larger than the official figure. If true, Taiwan may be spending up to 37 times less on defense than the country that is threatening to absorb it by invasion. By these numbers alone, Taiwan’s current defense spending is not just imprudent. It is borderline suicidal.
Nor is Taiwan’s level of spending especially onerous. Americans, by contrast, spend 3.5 percent of their GDP on defense. Poland, which shares a border with Ukraine, spends almost 4 percent. Israel, which faces fewer existential threats than Taiwan, spent 4.5 percent of its GDP on defense in 2022 and well over 5 percent for much of the past two decades. Given the massive disparity in military power in the Taiwan Strait, spending 5 percent of its GDP on defense should be the floor for Taiwan. Indeed, if its security and autonomy are at stake, why not spend 10 percent?
Taiwan’s meager defense spending is doubly problematic because, despite progress in formally adopting an asymmetric strategy, the bulk of the spending still goes to big-ticket items like fighter jets and warships that are expensive and extremely vulnerable to PLA strikes. Taiwan still remains very much behind in the acquisition of asymmetric capabilities that can meaningfully deter and deny a Chinese invasion. The US must do everything in its power to get Taiwan these weapons as quickly as possible. Yet Taiwanese leaders themselves have undermined this effort by urging the US to send key weapons, industrial base attention, and money to Ukraine rather than Taiwan.
Second, Taiwan may be banking on the idea that China will not invade. But there’s a reason that it’s a truism that basing one’s strategy and defense posture on hope is unwise. For an island facing the very realistic prospect of conquest by a far stronger military, it is incredibly reckless — not least because China is very clearly preparing to invade Taiwan.
In case there was any doubt, CIA Director William Burns confirmed last year that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has ordered the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has also said that Xi intends to unify Taiwan with China “on a much faster timeline” than previously anticipated. Meanwhile, China continues to develop, at historic speeds, the capabilities that would enable an invasion. Taiwanese defense strategy must be based on a full recognition of these realities, however unpleasant they might be. US Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo recently said that “we must be ready now, next week, next month, and in the decades to come” and that China could strike with little warning. Leaders in Taipei must take this message to heart.
Third, Taiwan may be thinking that, regardless of its lackluster defense spending, the US can always be counted on to come to its rescue. It is true that Taiwan is a very important strategic interest to the US. It is not, however, an existential interest. America has a strong interest in defending Taiwan, but Americans could survive without it. Our leaders cannot and realistically will not ask the American people to sacrifice for Taiwan at a cost that would be intolerable to the US. And they are unlikely to ask America’s sons and daughters to fight and give more than the Taiwanese themselves are willing to. It would in fact be immoral to put our troops in harm’s way for Taiwan when Taiwanese leaders haven’t done their part to ensure our doing so would not be reckless and futile.
The fact is that Americans already face a myriad of challenges at home. And after two decades of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans will undoubtedly be skeptical about entering into another costly, bloody war. Taipei must not take America’s commitment for granted but must work hard for it — not as a favor to Americans, but to make it more palatable for America to help defend Taiwan. In sum, Taiwan must dramatically increase its own defense spending, readiness and preparations if it is to stand a chance of deterring, let alone, defeating a Chinese invasion alongside American help.
Further — and crucially — if Taiwan does not get serious about its defense, then even if Americans do want to intervene, it may be a moot point. As Paparo recently testified, Taiwan’s ability to defend itself will have an outsized effect on our collective ability to defeat a Chinese invasion — or deter one in the first place. The opposite is also true. If Taipei fails to invest in the island’s defenses, then there may come a time when Taiwan is simply no longer defensible. At that point, America’s hands will be tied, and we will be forced to prepare to deny China’s hegemonic ambitions after Taiwan falls. To be clear, we very much do not want this outcome, but Taiwan’s lassitude is raising the risks we will be forced to confront this awful choice.
Taiwan is running out of time. It is on a knife’s edge in terms of its defensibility against a determined Chinese assault that Beijing is manifestly preparing for. Taiwan’s task is very challenging yet straightforward. Significantly increase your defense spending. Pursue every conceivable measure to strengthen the island’s defenses against invasion and blockade. Make the case to the world about why the defense of Taiwan is critical rather than engage in triple bank shot posturing about battles half a world away. Demand that production and deliveries of weapons needed for the island’s defense be prioritized over all else. And match your actions and rhetoric with the urgency the moment requires. Taiwan must change before it is too late. It is now or never.
Elbridge Colby is a principal at the Marathon Initiative. He led the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development. He is the author of The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict.
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