The absence of a formal security dialogue between Taiwan and Japan has been a salient subject of discussion, indicative of a significant void in the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region. The urgency of this matter was underscored in 2019 when President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) addressed its necessity in an interview with the Sankei Shimbun. Nevertheless, Japan has persisted in its policy of a “non-governmental practical relationship” with Taiwan, grounded on the tenets of the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communique, a stance that has been perceived as an implicit rejection of formal security talks.
Last year, a wargame conducted by the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies identified the absence of a security dialogue mechanism as a potential weak spot. The exercise underscored the need for initiating strategic discussions to enhance preparedness in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Despite the evident need for addressing security issues at the official level, the current discourse falls short in advocating for a major “breakthrough” that would supersede the limitations of the existing 1.5 or 2 track security dialogue.
The communication channels between Japan and Taiwan are overseen by non-governmental entities: The Taiwan-Japan Relations Association (representing Taiwan) and the Japan-Taiwan Exchanges Associations (Japan). These organizations concentrate primarily on the management of civil society activities, with national security issues falling outside their purview.
In the context of a potential crisis in Taiwan, the absence of a communication framework specifically dedicated to security could impede vital operations such as intelligence exchange, rear-area military support and the safe evacuation of nationals.
These bodies were not established to address national security concerns, let alone equipped to manage crises. Acknowledging the significance of facilitating security-related dialogue with Taipei, the ruling party in Japan proposed a parliamentary “2+2” security dialogue as a compromise in 2021 — two years after Tsai’s initial suggestion.
Although this proposal signifies progress, the tardiness of its introduction and credentials of the delegates involved demonstrate the substantial resistance and protracted pace toward the implementation of an executive-level security dialogue framework.
The alignment in recognizing the necessity for enhanced bilateral cooperation has not eliminated debate on the issue. A variety of alternative strategies have been proposed in response to the difficulty of arranging ministerial-level meetings with officials in the “2+2” dialogue. One such strategy involves the engagement of former ministers or senior officials who are no longer part of the Cabinet. These retired representatives, while maintaining a degree of “official” authority, could serve as policy advisers or participate in special committees, thereby indirectly influencing policy decisions.
However, this proposition must account for the political dynamics in Japan, including partisan divisions within political parties and the relationship dynamics between retired and current officials.
From the perspective of the Japanese government, the preservation of stable Sino-Japan relations takes precedence over the progression of Japan-Taiwan cooperation. Any potential collaboration with Taiwan on security matters should not jeopardize Japan’s overall diplomatic relationship with China.
Japan-Taiwan cooperation is often construed by Beijing as an infringement on its internal affairs and a promotion of pro-Taiwanese independence sentiment. China has repeatedly imposed explicit restrictions on Japan-Taiwan engagement, either through verbal warnings or retaliatory actions.
Consequently, cooperation between Tokyo and Taipei is circumscribed by an unspoken “tacit understanding” between Beijing and Tokyo.
While Japan acknowledges its vested interests in the event of a Taiwan contingency, it maintains that the primary responsibility for preserving the “status quo” lies with Taipei and Washington. Japan must therefore exercise caution in not assuming a preeminent role over these two key stakeholders.
Despite the well-established high-level security dialogue between the US and Taiwan, known as the “Monterey Talks,” Japan is aware of the risks associated with engaging in bilateral cooperation with Taiwan. Therefore, Tokyo’s primary concern is not how such a security mechanism could augment its response in a contingency scenario, but rather the potential backlash from Beijing.
To cultivate an enduring and progressive security dialogue between Japan and Taiwan, it is imperative that both entities engage in initial consultations. These should concentrate on pivotal topics such as the objectives of instituting a security dialogue mechanism, the transition from verbal discourse to practical action, the modality of collaboration and the circumstances under which Japan might propose a cessation.
Effective management of these facets is of utmost importance, as neglect could potentially lead to the disintegration of the initiative and damage the mutual trust and credibility that underpin it. Consequently, it is the responsibility of Tokyo and Taipei to engage in the exchange of ideas and work diligently toward a consensus on these issues.
However, the economic cooperation model that has been operational for more than five decades and has been effectively institutionalized at an official level could potentially serve as a blueprint for the security domain.
Since 1972, the Taiwan-Japan Economic and Trade Conference has been an annual event, alternating between Taipei and Tokyo. It is jointly organized by the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association and the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association, and is the primary platform for discussions on trade and investment between Taiwan and Japan.
More than 30 significant collaborations have been facilitated through this platform, including the execution of investment agreements, mutual recognition agreements for high-quality enterprises, memorandums of understanding to bridge industrial cooperation projects and agreements to prevent double taxation. While the event is orchestrated by civil organizations, it is attended by high-ranking officials, giving the economic and trade conference semi-official status.
Mirroring the incremental progress achieved through the bilateral economic platform, this approach offers practical and substantial means to foster the exchange and cooperation on security matters — a “piecemeal” and “issue-targeted” approach.
However, some have suggested that government-sponsored think tanks, which are already familiar with the nuances of 1.5 to 2 track exchanges, could replace the civil-oriented organizations to expedite a Taiwan-Japan security dialogue. High-priority issues such as cybersecurity and maritime affairs, which have been previously discussed through different platforms, could facilitate the signing of further agreements or memorandums of understanding.
Considering its consistent format, this approach could potentially minimize negative fallout and mitigate the risk of retaliation from China, thereby contributing to the long-term sustainability of the mechanism.
Taipei should acknowledge the significance of providing Japan with a degree of flexibility and refrain from imposing undue pressure. Such a strategy would foster a cooperative ambience more conducive to success, particularly in instances where Japan might be compelled to delay anticipated progress. Put differently, Japan should be entrusted with the “driver’s seat” in executing the proposal. Neglecting to afford Tokyo the necessary leeway to manage Beijing’s pressure could not only jeopardize the potential for enduring security collaboration between Japan and Taiwan, but also overlook the imperative of respecting other nations’ interests, which could potentially erode trust.
Cathy Fang is a policy analyst in the Project 2049 Institute.
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