Although this year is being heralded as a banner year for elections, with dozens of countries — representing more than half the global population — holding polls, for some it marks the nadir of democracy. Cambodia is one such case.
In July last year, after nearly 40 years in power, then-Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen announced that he would transfer power to his eldest son, Hun Manet. The hereditary succession was preceded by national elections that Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) claimed to have won by a landslide; but the US declared the vote as “neither free nor fair,” while EU officials said it was “conducted in a restricted political and civic space.” However, since then, the international community has more or less accepted Cambodia’s dynastic autocracy.
Like his father before him, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet has sought to assert control over Cambodians by interfering in their daily lives. For example, last month the new prime minister banned musical vehicle horns, which, as videos on social media have shown, encourage people to dance on the streets. Authorities fear that such public displays of joy could cause civil unrest.
Illustration: Yusha
Cambodians have been experiencing iron-fisted rule for decades, a trajectory that began with Hun Sen’s ascent to power in 1985. After serving as a middle-ranking officer in the Khmer Rouge, he defected to Vietnam, which installed a new government after invading Cambodia in 1979. First as foreign minister, and then as prime minister, Hun Sen worked to strengthen his grip on a country exhausted by war and decimated by the Khmer Rouge’s genocidal rule, which murdered up to 2 million people (including my parents).
When the first democratic elections were held in May 1993, under the watch of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, Hun Sen refused to cede power, even though the CPP finished second, and became one of two prime ministers under a power-sharing agreement. In a violent coup in 1997, Hun Sen deposed his co-prime minister and eliminated others who posed a threat to his rule. He went on to reintegrate hundreds of Khmer Rouge soldiers into Cambodian society.
Under the pretext of maintaining stability, Hun Sen’s government jailed and killed opposition activists, journalists and trade unionists, while aligning with China to extend its hold on power. Last year, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) personally congratulated Hun Sen on “winning” the rigged elections. Moreover, Cambodia’s constitutional monarch King Norodom Sihamoni refused to defy Hun Sen. The king often strategically absents himself from the country to avoid signing controversial legislation, allowing the president of the Senate to sign on his behalf.
The family dynasty and its supporters left nothing to chance ahead of Hun Manet’s accession in August last year. In addition to selecting Hun family loyalists as parliamentary candidates, the regime barred the opposition Candlelight Party from contesting last year’s elections and viciously attacked its members. The government thus continued its systematic repression of the political opposition: Those who stay in the country are routinely jailed, often on trumped-up technicalities and accusations of fraud, while those living abroad have been sentenced in absentia to decades of imprisonment.
Since taking office, Hun Manet has strengthened the stranglehold on independent media that his father initiated by surveilling journalists and threatening to close outlets that criticize the regime. Most worryingly, he has continued to court China, meeting with Xi in September last year. This suggests that his government, with the support of a powerful ally, is to clamp down harder on democratic rights.
The deployment of mass surveillance in major cities, including Phnom Penh, and Internet shutdowns further underscore Hun Manet’s determination to maintain control.
The large influx of Chinese money and workers into Cambodia also threatens to stoke tensions with Vietnam. Hun Manet’s government dances to all tunes. He congratulated Russian President Vladimir Putin on his “landslide” re-election, and he has finalized plans for the controversial, Chinese-financed Funan Techo canal, which would allow Cambodia to bypass Vietnam for its international trade and thus reduce its reliance on its neighbor. The project, together with the recent Chinese-funded upgrade of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, highlights China’s growing military and economic influence.
Meanwhile, Hun Manet has attempted to curry favor with the international community. In a speech at the most recent UN General Assembly, he said that Cambodia’s “democratic building process has steadily advanced.” So far, the West has given Hun Manet the benefit of the doubt, but US and European policymakers must wake up. For all their talk of countering a rising China, their passive acceptance of the Cambodian prime minister has given his government carte blanche to bulldoze what remains of the country’s fledgling democracy while allowing China to expand its reach in Southeast Asia.
The US government, in particular, has numerous tools — including the Cambodia Democracy Act, the Global Magnitsky Act and, if it passes, the proposed Transnational Repression Policy Act — that it could use to apply pressure on Hun Manet’s regime and hold it accountable for its abuses. These targeted sanctions should be coordinated with countries with similar legislation. US officials can and should bring the Hun family dynasty to heel by imposing sanctions on those who are undermining democracy and engaging in corruption. Stability in the region depends on it.
Mu Sochua, a former Cambodian politician and Nobel Peace Prize nominee, is president of the Khmer Movement for Democracy.
Copyright: roject Syndicate
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