This month has seen some drastic events in China that highlight the emerging challenge of legitimacy and the prioritization of state security over economy.
During China’s “two sessions” — annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference — Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) announced plans to upgrade “new quality productive forces,” in response to the stringent US sanctions against the country’s high-tech sectors.
For years, the worsening geopolitics has affected bilateral economic and cultural exchanges, causing much financial insecurity and stress for Chinese private and state-owned enterprises. In the face of domestic grievances, asserting effective leadership and utilizing high-tech industries to grow the economy is key to legitimacy and power.
Shortly after the “two sessions,” Hong Kong’s legislature approved a new security law, Article 23 of the Basic Law, to prosecute individuals for inciting subversion of state power and to bar foreign organizations from conducting political activities in the territory. When national security trumps all, it remains to be seen whether Hong Kong continue as a global financial hub or whether the local government would speed up the effort to merge the territory with China.
These events point to the challenge of legitimization amid a volatile political environment. Legitimacy is more than a mere belief in the rightful rule of a state-run bureaucracy; it is a relational practice, involving many interactions between the rulers and ruled. It rests on the conviction that the authorities, be they democratic or authoritarian, are or appear to be willing to issue commands beneficial to the public. In the absence of such a consensus, there can only be unequal power relations between the rulers and subjects.
Non-democratic states have trouble securing legitimacy through a free and fair electoral procedure designed to reflect the diverse interests in society. Autocrats resort to coercive violence to stay in power and devote more resources to maintain the rule of fear. Without spending much on effective governance, the reduction of welfare support for the marginalized makes these rulers more repressive and vulnerable to internal collapse. This perpetual cycle of oppression and mismanagement is playing out in China, Hong Kong and Myanmar.
Worse still, without a rational-legal framework that distributes political power through an electoral process, the art of gaining legitimacy relies on performative elements. Legitimacy is thought to be earned through good policy choices and economic performance. Popular support for regimes is not just derived from successful development, but also from the widespread perception that the government cares for the people and is willing to control corruption. This explains why Chinese officials have implemented top-down policies to promote modernization and make visible improvements in everyday lives. However, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the global economic meltdown in 2008 and China’s developmental challenges today reveal the fragility of financial successes.
Even though Xi and his political appointees in Hong Kong are satisfied with the way things are, dissidents have seen through the authorities’ tendency to justify harsh governance with appeals to stability and order. Worrying about China’s economic slowdown and Hong Kong’s new security order, civic advocates at home and abroad are striving to broaden the limited scope of their activism. They have spent years beating the odds and are unlikely to give up now.
Joseph Tse-hei Lee is a professor of history at Pace University in New York. In spring this year, he is a Taiwan Fellow and a visiting scholar at Academia Sinica.
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