In the past week, lawmakers of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the main opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) have been debating whether President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) should visit Itu Aba Island (Taiping Island, 太平島) to reinforce Taiwan’s sovereignty claim before she steps down from office in May.
Whether the head of state visiting the outpost would be in Taiwan’s national interest is questionable. Why the KMT would choose to push Tsai to visit at this time is even more questionable.
Located 1,500km southwest of Kaohsiung, Itu Aba is the largest of the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands, 南沙群島), a disputed archipelago of more than 100 small islands and reefs in the South China Sea. The island hosts a few structures and about 200 members of the coast guard who hold defense drills regularly. It is also claimed by China, the Philippines and Vietnam.
Since Taiwan in January completed a major maintenance and dredging project, which would allow larger vessels, up to 4,000-tonne patrol frigates, to dock at the wharf on the island, there had been calls by legislators for Tsai to attend the wharf reopening ceremony on Monday to reassert the nation’s sovereignty.
As the president did not attend the ceremony, the KMT legislative caucus on Tuesday urged her to visit the island before the end of her second term on May 19. Its caucus convener, Fu Kun-chi , accused Tsai of “chickening out” like a turtle huddled up inside its shell, and its legislators said that Tsai and the DPP do not dare to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The legislature’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee co-convener, KMT Legislator Ma Wen-chun (馬文君), on Tuesday said the committee has arranged to visit and inspect the island on May 16.
They also cited former presidents Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) and Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) visits to the island before stepping down from office in urging Tsai to do the same.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) on Wednesday reaffirmed Taiwan’s sovereignty over the island, but cited the recent dangerous standoff between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, adding that Taiwan “must consider how to use peaceful means to resolve the South China Sea issue, not letting others think we are creating difficulties.”
National Security Bureau Director-General Tsai Ming-yen (蔡明彥) on Thursday also advised against the visit at this time, raising concerns that the trip might be perceived by other countries as intensifying the already tense geopolitical situation, and poses potential security risks to the head of state, as Chinese military aircraft and warships have reportedly been shadowing non-Chinese vessels and aircraft in the disputed waters.
China Coast Guard vessels have been reported repeatedly trying to harass and block Philippine resupply vessels in the South China Sea, including using water cannons and causing collisions, since December last year, with the latest collision reported by Manila yesterday morning.
While it is unwise to stir up unnecessary conflict in the region, it is worth noting that since the Taiwanese government established a garrison on Itu Aba in 1956, Chen and Ma are the only two presidents who have visited the island.
The move could not have had any impact on the ongoing South China Sea tribunal in The Hague at that time, as Itu Aba is viewed technically as a rock and not an island, and therefore not subject to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
It is worth questioning why KMT lawmakers such as Ma Wen-chun are all of a sudden eager to “defend the nation and claim sovereignty,” when they continue to keep quiet as Chinese aircraft and vessels increasingly cross the Taiwan Strait median line.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval
RSS