US President Joe Biden on Thursday last week vowed to support peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait — the first time he did so in a State of the Union Address.
Biden had on four occasions — mainly in response to media queries — asserted that Washington would provide military aid to defend Taiwan against a hypothetical invasion by China. During his address to the US Congress, the US president did not, as is customary, start with domestic affairs, focusing instead on international issues, such as Taiwan.
“We’re standing up against China’s unfair economic practices, and standing up for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,” he said.
Biden added that he has revitalized the nation’s partnerships and alliances in the Asia-Pacific region and made sure the most advanced US technologies cannot be used in Chinese weapons.
“We’re in a stronger position to win the competition for the 21st century against China,” he said.
While the US presidential election in November will almost certainly be a rematch between Biden and former US president Donald Trump, Biden’s address is widely considered to have made the case that he has done a better job in foreign affairs than Trump, who is considered a transactional leader prioritizing US interests and taking an isolationist strategy in international affairs.
Biden’s words are not only a warning to China about its escalating military intrusions across the Taiwan Strait, they also set the tone that no matter who wins the election, confronting China’s economic unfairness and geopolitical expansionism will be a major challenge — as it is with Russia.
Biden’s statement also confronted the rising “US skepticism,” which has long been promoted by Beijing’s state propaganda to subvert relations between the US and its allies, including Taiwan.
A spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office recently said that “the US could abandon Taiwan under a second Trump presidency” and “the US will always pursue ‘America First,’ and Taiwan could change from a ‘chess piece’ to an ‘abandoned piece’ at any time.”
President-elect William Lai (賴清德) and his new administration, which is to take office in May, should get prepared for the US election and set up a new strategy to ensure mutually trustworthy and beneficial relations with the US. One priority should be to put Taiwan-China tensions under the Indo-Pacific framework to ensure that US foreign policy maintains its influence and keep order in the region, which would benefit Taipei.
If Trump returns to the White House, that would also cause concerns for China and Russia. Trump in 2016 made a historic phone call to then-president-elect Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), a leap forward in US-
Taiwan relations that put a hole in China’s coercive “one China” principle.
Taiwan should also advance cooperation with international like-minded democracies, especially with neighboring the Philippines, India, Japan and South Korea. Manila has struck new security agreements with at least 18 countries since a China Coast Guard vessel last year flashed a military-grade laser at Philippine ships, aiming to establish a “network of alliances.” Taiwan could learn from its example by establishing a security campaign spanning the South and East China seas, as well as the Taiwan Strait, to deter Chinese aggression.
Having a shared threat perception could be one of the most important drivers for closer strategic relations, experts have said.
Taiwan’s incoming government should make the best of concerns in Washington and the international community over China’s coercive expansionism to help safeguard the nation’s sovereignty and development.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval
RSS