Super Tuesday, the biggest day of the US presidential primaries campaigns, is over and the results are plain for all to see.
The two main US political parties’ candidates have basically been determined in what could be history’s quickest settling of the dust for a primary battle of the fittest.
US President Joe Biden is practically unopposed in seeking the Democratic Party’s nomination.
Meanwhile, from the moment the proverbial starting pistol was fired, former US president Donald Trump steamrolled over challengers in the Republican Party, leaving his opponents far behind.
Regardless of who wins in the general election, the ripple effects would be felt in Washington’s relationships with Taipei and Beijing.
The meeting between Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on the sidelines of the APEC summit in San Francisco in November last year set the tone for constructive competition and should not lead to dramatic changes in the foreseeable future.
It would be nearly impossible for the US and China to completely decouple from each other, as lowering risks of a confrontation has become a point of consensus to prevent the relationship from spiraling downward.
China has become the largest threat to US national security and its geopolitical strategy.
Should Biden win a second term, he is unlikely to loosen his grip on the “speak softly and carry a big stick” approach Washington uses to deal with Beijing. His administration’s high tariffs and export controls on high-tech goods and semiconductors have been designed with Beijing’s ambitions in mind.
The Chinese government, stretched thin addressing multiple internal difficulties, is unlikely to want to expand or start new external conflicts.
Its current phase of a “cold war” with Washington is not a winning strategy. However, “cold peace” would allow Beijing to stall for time.
With the US presidential election in full swing, both candidates believe the Chinese Communist Party would be hesitant to touch upon sensitive geopolitical topics, hastily pursue conflict or test the waters.
However, US-China trade and technology disputes were launched during Trump’s administration, the effects of which hit Beijing particularly hard.
Trump has thrown his hat into the presidential ring once more, and he has not held back on threatening to impose a flat 10 percent tariff across the board on all the countries he criticizes for supposedly enjoying trade imbalances at the US’ expense and exploiting work opportunities for Americans.
He has singularly pointed a finger at China for its adoption of unfair trade practices through its exported goods and said he would impose tariffs that could reach up to 60 percent.
Should Trump return to the White House, he would perhaps set in place much more severe plans.
Chinese officials might not have directly expressed any weakness so far, but their anxiety is starting to seep through their choice of words and expressions.
Despite trade tariff threats, Trump’s “global withdrawal” and promotion of US isolationism is something Chinese officials are secretly spinning cartwheels over.
Isolationism seems tantamount to providing Beijing with the opportunity to stick the needle into any gaps and seams it can, and fill in or replace the role the US plays in the spheres of international geopolitical governance or economics, which Beijing could use to challenge the US, as well as the Western democratic camp, in establishing international rules and systems.
The rock-solid relationship between the US and Taiwan, which has received support from both sides of the aisle in Washington, is based on the Taiwan Relations Act, the “six assurances” and long-standing bilateral trust and mutual benefits.
The Biden administration’s plan to dispatch a delegation of high-level officials and representatives to the May 20 inauguration of president-elect William Lai (賴清德) is a key indicator of these ties.
Attention must be paid to the contents of Lai’s inauguration speech.
He and vice president-elect Hsiao Bi-khim’s (蕭美琴) administration is sure to face a plethora of hurdles and challenges, and would need to prioritize its policies based on value systems, strategic benefits, security cooperation, economic linkages and other stalwart advantages that are deeply ingrained within Taiwan-US relations.
That would allow for even more opportunities to work with Washington under a free and open Indo-Pacific framework, including items such as concentrated and consolidated discussions on armaments purchases for national defense and accelerating the signing of trade framework agreements and tax treaties.
Taiwan maintains a neutral stance on US presidential elections and does not show favoritism toward any particular US political party.
However, Taipei pays close attention to Democrats’ and Republicans’ international relations and national security policies and dives deeply into the meaning behind their respective stances. This year is no exception.
Taiwan coldly and rationally observes and scrutinizes Biden’s and Trump’s campaign rhetoric and policy proposals concerning the Indo-Pacific region, the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Taipei does not have the luxury of indulging in wishful thinking.
It is necessary to seek out US public sentiment, through polling and surveys, to understand the trends in the US elections and convey Taipei’s hopes and concerns pertaining to relevant issues.
Regardless of the results of the US’ Nov. 5 elections, the sustainability, stability and predictability of reinforcement and tenacity of bilateral relations are guaranteed.
Stanley Kao was Taiwan’s representative to the US from 2016 to 2020.
Translated by Tim Smith
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