For millennia, stratagem and deception have been baked into Chinese strategic culture and statecraft.
So it is imperative to consider the risks of Chinese deception regarding theater or tactical nuclear weapons of under 5,000 kilometer range.
Centuries before the birth of Christ, Chinese military experts who contributed to the eventual Sunzi Bingfa (孫子兵法), or The Art of War, attributed to Master Sun, had concluded that “All warfare is based on deception.”
Often referenced in the West as if reduced to cliche, Sunzi Bingfa is of paramount importance to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
This fact goes far to explain the centrality of stratagem and duplicity in Chinese statecraft and CCP official statements.
For example, on January 25, former Chinese Ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai (崔天凱) told a Washington, DC conference of the Asia Society Policy Institute that China would not fall into the “trap” of a war with Taiwan with “Chinese killing Chinese.”
So, Taiwanese who do not consider themselves “Chinese” could be automatic targets, and besides, Cui’s CCP historically has had no hesitation to kill Chinese, having already murdered over 50 million.
Right after the word “deception,” Sunzi Bingfa counsels, “Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity.”
It appears that a very high deception priority for the CCP and its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been to plant in the minds of its potential enemies that the PLA has no, or only a small number of, theater nuclear weapons.
One major advantage for doing so is to give the PLA the ability to reveal a robust capability to wage theater nuclear warfare on the eve of a massive invasion of Taiwan, a shock perhaps sufficient to convince a vacillating leadership in Washington burdened with multiple global conflicts not to defend Taiwan.
Writing in the Fall 2019 issue of journal International Security in an article titled “Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation,” copiously citing Chinese written and interview sources, now University of Pennsylvania Professor Fiona Cunningham, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Professor M. Taylor Fravel, concluded:
“China never deployed tactical nuclear weapons either to counter a Soviet invasion of China in the 1980s or, to date, to threaten limited nuclear strikes in a maritime and air war against the United States.”
Based apparently on 2016 author interviews in Beijing, they further conclude, “A key assumption in Chinese views of tactical nuclear weapons is that China does not need to substitute nuclear weapons for conventional weapons to gain a military advantage or coercive advantage over an adversary.”
They offer a caveat that the 4,000 kilometer range DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missile — described as both conventional- and nuclear-warhead capable by Chinese parade announcers in a large 2015 Chinese military parade — could be used as a tactical nuclear weapon.
But they then discount that possibility, assessing it was less likely to be nuclear armed given that the PLA had other nuclear-armed medium range, and longer range intercontinental nuclear missiles.
An updated assessment of the DF-26 is offered in the “Nuclear Notebook, Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024,” of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), by Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight.
After citing the US Department of Defense 2023 China Military Power Report (CMPR) assessment that the PLA had 250 launchers and 500 DF-26 missiles, they state, “…we cautiously estimate that probably only half of the DF-26 launchers now serve a regional nuclear role.”
But while the 2022 CMPR did note that the 3,000km range hypersonic maneuverable warhead DF-17 could be nuclear armed, that this was not mentioned in the 2023 CMPR led FAS to conclude, “…we no longer include the DF-17 in our estimate of Chinese nuclear forces.”
But what if instead the PLA has deployed multiple types of tactical nuclear warhead armed theater missiles for a much longer period?
Consider the observations of former Vice Chief of Staff of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces Col. General Victor Esin, who began his career as acting chief engineer of a Soviet SS-4 nuclear missile during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but then spent decades defending Russia against China’s nuclear forces.
Although he retired in 1997, Esin embarked on a second career in Russian think tanks, has been a featured expert for many conferences on the Cuban Missile Crisis, and is one of the most prolific public Russian commentators on China’s nuclear forces.
In an October 26, 2016 article in the Russian publication Sputnik, Esin considers the PLA’s then large force of DF-11 and DF-15 short-to-medium range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), introduced in the mid-1990s, and the newer medium range DF-16.
Esin observed, “All of them have two variants in terms of armament — conventional and nuclear. According to available information, about 10-15% of DF-11s, and 20-25% of DF-15s, are equipped with nuclear warheads.”
What if, in fact, all theater-range PLA missiles and cruise missiles are dual-capable, or capable of being armed with nuclear warheads, to include the DF-11, DF-15, DF-16, DF-17, DF-21, DF-26 and CJ-10 ground-launched, and CJ-20 air-launched land attack cruise missiles (LACMs)?
The 2023 CMPR states that the PLA has 2500 intermediate, medium- and short-range ground-launched ballistic missiles, and 300 ground-launched cruise missiles for a total of 2,800 ground-launched missiles.
But the 2023 CMPR does not include estimates for PLA air-launched cruise missiles.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) now operates about 150 Xian Aircraft Corporation H-6K/J/N 3,000 kilometer radius theater bombers that can each carry six CJ-20 LACMs.
This potentially means up to 900 LACMs per total force sortie, or 2,700 LACMs with three sorties.
In a Taiwan war, the PLA could fire the 1,500km range CJ-20 from well within China protected by very dense integrated air defenses, aiding their ability to survive to undertake multiple sorties.
As the potential total number of PLA theater range missiles could approach 5,500 missiles, an appropriate question is how many would be nuclear armed?
The CCP/PLA likely will never reveal this number, but neither does the open/public version of the US Department of Defense CMPR, though it could be part of the non-public classified version.
But potentially for the time a US Government assessment of the severity of the PLA theater nuclear threat was given on February 29, 2024 before the US Senate Armed Services Committee by US Strategic Command Commander General Anthony Cotton:
“... the PRC has approximately 1,000 medium and intermediate-range dual-capable conventional or nuclear ballistic missiles capable of inflicting significant damage to US, Allied, or partner forces and homelands in the Indo-Pacific.”
On the plus side this revelation pierces China’s non-transparency and its long attempts at deception.
But it also sets a benchmark that will be debated, criticized by liberals as excessive and by conservatives as insufficient.
Interestingly, if one applies the average of percentage ranges of nuclear armed SRBMs offered by General Esin in 2016, about 17.5 percent, to a potential force of 5,500 theater missiles, one gets a possible 962 PLA nuclear armed theater missiles.
But it also can be viewed as an affirmation for a Chinese strategic culture steeped in the Sunzi Bingfa admonition, “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”
As the PLA has been building its theater nuclear forces for decades, China’s pervasive deception to conceal its actual theater nuclear forces doctrine and capabilities has helped to produce a profound military advantage — especially should the CCP decide to wage a near-term war to conquer Taiwan and murder its democracy.
In some scenarios the PLA’s theater nuclear advantage could prove decisive as the US has failed to develop and deploy a symmetrical theater deterrent force.
In 2024 the US has no tactical nuclear bombs, no tactical nuclear armed short, medium or intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missiles, or no nuclear armed cruise missiles deployed in Asia.
Thanks to Donald Trump, low-yield W76-2 tactical nuclear warheads arm a very small number of Trident nuclear submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles, but using a “strategic” missile risks giving China, Russia or North Korea an excuse to escalate to a strategic nuclear exchange.
To deter conflict in Asia it is imperative that Washington rapidly increase its inventory of theater nuclear weapons to at least achieve symmetrical deterrence against Chinese, Russian and North Korean theater nuclear weapons, to preclude risking nuclear escalation by employing strategic nuclear weapons in potential Asian conflicts — when US strategic nuclear forces should be deterring growing Chinese, Russian and North Korean strategic nuclear threats.
Richard D. Fisher, Jr. is a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center.
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