India uses multilateral and bilateral vehicles as it sails through the choppy waters of today’s geopolitical waves.
In terms of countries, China is the biggest challenge for India’s foreign policy, the ORF Foreign Policy Survey 2023, which polled young Indians, showed. The survey helps show how New Delhi’s policy responses and diplomatic nimbleness are perceived by urban youth.
The main challenges to Indian interests were pandemics, which 90 percent of respondents picked as the top challenge; 88 percent opined terrorism; 86 percent said the post-COVID-19 pandemic economic downturn; while cyberthreats and climate change both garnered 85 percent.
The survey had a sample size of 5,000 respondents aged 18 to 35 from 19 cities. The questionnaire was administered in 11 regional languages to capture a wide range of responses.
Eighty-four percent viewed border issues with China as an immense challenge, with 80 percent perceiving that clashes in Galwan in 2020, leading to casualties, had greatly reduced trust in China. Forty-seven percent saw conflict with China as a major threat, more than the challenge of unreformed multilateral organizations.
China influences challenges such as cybersecurity; economic slowdowns and supply chain disruptions; and pandemics. Yet 58 percent of respondents sought more economic engagement with China. These figures of distrust while seeking economic engagement have not significantly altered from the 2022 survey.
While none of the main challenges identified are directly linked to China, when it comes to bilateral perceptions, it is China among all countries that gets the least marks for trustworthiness.
Young people felt that Indian foreign policy was performing well, last year’s survey showed. Support for foreign policy — at 83 percent — was 6 percentage points higher than the 2022 survey and 11 percentage points higher than in 2021. This shows that young Indians are more satisfied with the manner in which India’s foreign policy is conducted.
A more robust approach to China is appreciated.
Forty-seven percent preferred multilateralism to pursue international engagement; 80 percent believed that India should be a permanent member of the UN Security Council, showing India’s rising stature; and 58 percent said that India should be a G7 permanent invitee.
These results were buttressed with India’s G20 presidency, which was seen as a success, with 83 percent saying it was effective in addressing the nation’s interests.
Last year’s survey showed that 74 percent saw the G20 as an effective body, a significant rise over the 2022 result.
Regarding intergovernmental agencies, 76 percent said they had faith in the WTO; the WHO and the World Bank scored more than 70 percent each; BRICS was at 70 percent and the Non-Aligned Movement garnered 60 percent.
The unsaid aspect is that India’s multilateralism, its entry into the UN Security Council and its role in the G20 have negative connotations for Beijing, which perhaps contributes to the high distrust of the rival. China blocks India’s emergence in some international organizations such as APEC. It is clear that China does not support the expansion of permanent membership of the UN Security Council and thus restrains Indian ambitions.
The absence of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) from the G20 Summit in New Delhi was another effort to keep away from a meeting where India would be in the limelight.
Thirty-two percent see China’s role in multilateral organizations negatively for these reasons.
Significantly among the respondents, 81 percent believed that the US is the best partner for India, although it was 4 percent lower than in 2022. Support for the non-India members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) — Australia, Japan and the US — earned level support across Indian cities, emphasizing respondents’ understanding of the importance of such bilateral partnerships to deal with new and emerging challenges, including growing Chinese belligerence.
If China had not reneged on tranquility at the border, perhaps Indian opinions would be less inclined toward the US.
Despite the distrust in China, 44 percent of respondents felt that India should stay neutral in the US-China rivalry. An equal number felt that cooperation with the US should take priority. There is a gentle shift toward partnership with the US, with 85 percent saying that Washington should support New Delhi more in the India-China rivalry.
With regard to the Russia-Ukraine war, 80 percent agreed that India should remain neutral and exhibit strategic autonomy, and 82 percent said that India should diversify its defense relationship away from Russia.
The sentiment that India is concerned about the growing Russia-China relationship rose to 76 percent, 8 percent higher than in 2022, again a function of distrust of China.
Seventy-two percent agreed that the G7’s de-risking strategy against China is more beneficial to India than its decoupling strategy.
In India’s neighborhood, the maximum trust factor was with Nepal (72 percent), followed by Bhutan (63 percent), the Maldives (62 percent) and Sri Lanka (61 percent). Bangladesh was surprisingly low at 46 percent, while Myanmar had 54 percent and Thailand had 64 percent, the highest after Nepal.
Pakistan was trusted by 10 percent, the lowest, and Afghanistan by 28 percent — 81 percent distrusted Pakistan and 56 percent distrusted Afghanistan.
Eighty-three percent of respondents agreed that India’s development cooperation with its neighbors was adequate. Their support for India’s assistance to Sri Lanka was 80 percent, while Nepal was 76 percent and Bangladesh 56 percent.
In a separate question relating to China, 61 percent said that they were concerned about Chinese debt traps in nations near India, with 79 percent saying that Beijing uses its influence in multilateral institutions to restrict Indian interests and 78 percent saying that trust in China had severely diminished since 2020.
Seventy-seven percent said that Chinese encroachment on their shared border would have long-term implications for India’s development and security.
Among trilateral and Quad arrangements, the Quad had the highest support at 74 percent among urban youth in India, with 80 percent saying that India and the US should enhance the Quad partnership against emerging challenges. This indicates that such partnerships are seen as a way to deal with China.
As the global order changes and India’s emergence is more recognized, perhaps the survey offers an important reference to understand how India’s young people think about the nation’s foreign-policy goals and achievements.
Gurjit Singh is a former Indian ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, ASEAN, Ethiopia and the African Union.
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