Taiwanese-American Amy Lee submitted a letter to the Taipei Times yesterday morning. It is printed on this page. It is about Saturday’s presidential election, but more generally is about the perceptions and misperceptions overseas about Taiwan and about the right of Taiwanese not only to make their own decisions about their future, but also to take control of how they perceive their past and their identity.
Two phrases stand out: “So I grew up correcting those who mistake Taiwan for Thailand, the Burmese flag as ours,” and “As the world enjoyed our bubble milk tea, I could barely swallow mine.”
A decade ago, few people around the world seemed to know where Taiwan was on the map, and even fewer had any idea about its recent history or its relationship with China. How frustrating and demoralizing this would be for Taiwanese who are proud of their identity and past.
However, it is not surprising, because of the complexity of the issue, especially when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is doing its level and persistent best to obfuscate the truth to support its own interests and unfounded claim over Taiwan.
This is changing. In the post-COVID-19 pandemic era, Taiwan’s international profile has much increased, and so has the understanding of the importance of having an objective grasp of the truth.
The change in the US’ approach to Taiwan is well-documented. Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, an assistant professor at National Dong Hwa University in Hualien County, highlighted in a recent Taipei Times opinion piece (“Deep Taiwan-EU ties hard to break,” Jan. 10, page 8) how Europe’s understanding of Taiwan’s importance has progressed in recent years, as well as how closely European national leaders would be watching the outcome of Saturday’s election.
Sana Hashmi, a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation wrote in the Taipei Times about how New Delhi, too, has changed its position on Taiwan (“India is eyeing Taiwan’s elections,” Dec. 29 last year, page 8).
International interest in Taiwan has been piqued both on the individual level and on the official policy level.
British businessman Bob Burrage also submitted an opinion piece yesterday, commenting on the past 70 years of Taiwanese history and cross-strait relations, China’s increasingly assertive behavior in the East and South China seas, and recommending options for improving Taipei’s asymmetric warfare capabilities, wishing Taiwan the best of luck from the UK.
The point is not the caliber of the assessment. It is the breadth and reach of interest in Taiwan, a far cry from people not knowing the difference between Thailand and Taiwan.
On a more official level in the UK, former Dutch diplomat Gerrit van der Wees, who teaches the history of Taiwan and US relations with East Asia at George Mason University in the US, was commissioned by the Council on Geostrategy in the UK to write “Taiwan: The facts of history versus Beijing’s myths,” which was published on Monday and is available on the council’s Web site. The council, launched in March 2021, is, in its own words, “a reputable think tank dedicated to generating a new generation of geostrategic thinking for a more competitive age.” The title of Van der Wees’ paper tells you all you need to know about its purpose.
Finally, former member of the Tibetan parliament-in-exile, Khedroob Thondup, writes on this page an appeal to Taiwanese voters from the position of somebody painfully aware of the dangers posed by the CCP.
Lee has reason to be frustrated and indignant. She can perhaps take some succor in that things are changing for the better.
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