This year marked the 20th anniversary of the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership between the EU and China, as well as the 25th anniversary of the establishment of a meeting mechanism for EU and Chinese leaders. The EU and China decided to open their hearts and talk about their relationships, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen candidly commented on the EU-China relations before the meeting. Von der Leyen wanted to resolve the EU trade deficit of almost 400 billion euros (US$439.8 billion) and compel China to distance itself from Russia.
Meanwhile, she did not want to reduce tariffs on China and ignored Beijing’s friendly gestures including a number of trade concessions, 15-day visa waiver programs for five European countries and easing its economic threats against Lithuania. No wonder the EU could not get what it wanted.
Beijing said that the EU could allow China to import high-tech products from Europe to lower the deficit, and on its relations with Russia, Chinese officials frankly confirmed its close ties with Moscow. Obviously, Beijing no longer wants to tolerate the EU’s intervention in its business, such as the development of electric vehicles. This was also how Beijing reacted to the EU’s recent moves, including Brussels’ stance on the South China Sea, the unanimous passage of resolution on EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations, and other resolutions concerning Taiwan. Needless to say, these moves run counter to China’s plans.
Due to the conflict with the US, Beijing worked hard on relations with the EU, but not anymore. Clearly, it has to do with the easing of the US-China tension, the EU leadership that is about to change next year and China’s diversification of its market, for example improving ties with Vietnam. Beijing is disappointed in how the EU has been treating it as a “systematic rival” rather than a partner. The Chinese government also realized that it would be more effective to work with a single European country rather than with the EU as a whole, as demonstrated by how French President Emmanuel Macron was well received while EU officials were ignored. Interestingly, von der Leyen is likely to continue her term.
Confronted by Beijing’s reactions, the EU reacted to them. On Wednesday, the European Parliament unreservedly passed resolutions friendly to Taiwan. Although these resolutions are nonbinding, the EU has shown its stance. The resolution on EU-China relations for the first time strongly opposes China’s constant distortion of UN Resolution 2758. The Chinese delegation was outraged by this. The other two resolutions uphold the significance of maintaining stability and democracy in the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China seas, suggesting a collaboration with the Indo-Pacific Strategy spearheaded by the US.
China needs foreign investment, while the EU needs to reduce its trade deficits. Seemingly, as long as they invest in each other, they would get what they need.
However, the EU and China have too many problems to deal with first. As Beijing said, China could import European high-tech products or invest in Europe to lower the EU’s deficit, but this would only make the EU lose its edge, as happened to its solar energy and electric vehicle industries. Whether China’s importation of tech products is for civilian or military use is also an issue.
The EU should remember that Taiwan is always here. Be it technology or trade, Taiwan is an indispensable and trustworthy partner that the EU can benefit from.
Chang Meng-jen is chair of Fu Jen Catholic University’s Department of Italian Language and Culture and coordinator of the university’s diplomacy and international affairs program.
Translated by Emma Liu
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