The tone of President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) final Double Ten National Day address earlier this month was similar to that of her 2016 speech — that maintaining the “status quo” is the consensus among Taiwan’s parties and communities.
However, as everyone knows, Taiwan and the world have changed dramatically over the past seven years. The US and China have gone from being friends to enemies. This period has seen such drastic events as the global COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and, most recently, the terrorist attack by Hamas against Israel.
The end of the globalization era was marked by the US’ technology sanctions against China, while geopolitical disruption is exemplified by China’s efforts to assemble an international authoritarian bloc.
In a fast-changing world, Taiwan’s strategic position is rising, as is its importance in the semiconductor supply chain. Under such circumstances, Taiwan’s “status quo” cannot remain completely unchanged.
Tsai has had her ups and downs over the past seven years, but overall, Taiwan has progressed. In next year’s presidential election, voters again face a critical decision. The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) represent alternative paths. The “blue” KMT and the “white” Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) want Taiwan to follow policies that would make it dependent on China, while the DPP prioritizes strong relations with the US as part of the nation’s foreign policy.
A policy of dependence on China would mean that democratic Taiwan would have to backtrack to cater to authoritarian China’s digital dictatorship and accept the same destiny as Hong Kong without offering any resistance.
At the same time, Taiwan would have to be friendly with nations such as Russia, Iran and North Korea as its economy and trade relations become linked to this group of countries, and this shift would cause the US to extend its technology sanctions against China to Taiwan.
Conversely, continuing to prioritize relations with the US means standing with the world’s democratic camp, as advocated by former presidents Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), and maintaining the situation under which the democratic camp protects Taiwan in everything from geopolitics to the industrial chain.
An interesting aside is that Chen Binhua (陳斌華), the new spokesman of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), has made some opening moves that are worth keeping an eye on. After DPP presidential candidate Vice President William Lai (賴清德) said that accepting Beijing’s “one China” principle does not represent mainstream public opinion in Taiwan, Chen retorted that “the golden child of Taiwanese independence will only jeopardize Taiwan’s future generations.”
Critical comments such as this, aimed at the DPP, are part of Chen’s daily routine, but he has made two other statements directed at the KMT, one positive and the other negative, which seem a bit unusual.
One comment came after senior KMT politician and former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) declined an invitation to attend the Double Ten National Day celebrations because, according to Ma, attending the celebration would “in a roundabout, furtive way be an endorsement of Taiwanese independence.”
Chen applauded Ma’s decision enthusiastically, saying: “We commend Mr Ma Ying-jeou and other people from all walks of life on the island for their clear opposition to Taiwan independence.”
Chen’s other comment was in reaction to a statement by KMT Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia (夏立言), who told reporters that the KMT is not a pro-China party or a unification party and that “we have the experience, ability, willingness and the political foundation to deal with cross-strait relations.”
Chen promptly responded with a verbal slap in the face for Hsia, saying that “people in the mainland [China] have often expressed their dissatisfaction with such remarks that undermine the mutual trust between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and hurt the feelings of compatriots on both sides.” This remark was clearly meant as a reminder to KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) not to overstep certain lines.
By keeping such a close eye on everything the KMT says and does, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is treating it as Beijing’s “tail party,” which is obliged to wag in time with the CCP’s backside.
In spite of almost daily harassment of Taiwan by China’s armed forces, Chu has several times sent Hsia to visit China, while Ma has visited China’s Hunan Province to pay homage to his ancestors, as well as organizing youth exchanges. Clearly, leading members of the KMT are trying to outdo each other in pandering to China’s dictatorship.
Meanwhile, many members of the KMT’s middle and lower strata, including local factions, representatives, councilors and even mayors, county commissioners and legislators, have long been in the clutches of the TAO. The incident involving KMT Legislator Ma Wen-chun (馬文君), who has been accused of leaking secret information about Taiwan’s indigenous submarine project to South Korean officials, highlights the seriousness of the situation.
China’s no-holds-barred reaction to Hsia’s tricky statements, which were intended for a domestic audience, has been enlightening for Taiwanese. Of course, Beijing’s total lack of tolerance would not boost the KMT’s chances in next year’s elections, but in democratic Taiwan, the KMT still has a chance of being voted back into government.
Furthermore, after a peaceful or non-peaceful unification of Taiwan with China, Beijing would still need a cooperative regime in Taiwan, and the KMT would prove valuable for this purpose. Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee (李家超) has set an example for the KMT. As long as the KMT obeys the CCP, it would be rewarded with the power to rule Taiwan.
It remains to be seen whether the presidential election would bring a different political party into government. However, if power corrupts, as it surely does, how can the DPP occupy the nation’s top office forever? In the current political ecology, the failure of a Taiwan-centric regime would be an opportunity for a pro-China regime, unless a situation arises in which the two main contending parties are both Taiwan-centric.
Over the years, Beijing has employed a “united front” strategy toward all aspects of Taiwanese society, including within Taiwan-centric forces. This approach has induced a number of politicians to switch from “green” to “blue” and even to “red” — a fine example being TPP Chairman and presidential candidate Ko Wen-je (柯文哲).
As a result, the “non-greens” have held back the Taiwanese independence movement, while Beijing has made a show of force against Taiwan to intimidate Washington from departing from its “one China” policy, thus suppressing Taiwan’s efforts to operate internationally as a normal country.
In contrast, if a pro-China regime were to get into office, the governments of both sides of the Taiwan Strait could join hands to promote unification, as can be seen from what happened when Ma Ying-jeou was president. Such a scenario of peaceful unification endorsed by a democratically elected government would make it difficult for the US to intervene. For this reason, Taiwan faces the potential risk of democracy burying democracy, with Taiwanese voters selling themselves out with their own votes.
From this point of view, the “status quo” is like a coin, with heads and tails, and like a knife, which is useful, but also dangerous. Therefore, in maintaining the “status quo,” Taiwanese must be progressive and not be reduced to tying their own hands. If, on the other hand, Taiwanese pursue the “status quo” defensively, the nation would be confined to a pattern of backsliding, which would run contrary to its constantly evolving democracy and Taiwan-friendly geopolitical dynamics.
The “status quo” should represent the existing niche created by various factors converging on Taiwan. We must prevent regression and ensure continued progress.
Beijing’s strategy for when a Taiwan-centric regime is in power consists of doing everything it can to freeze Taiwan’s progress toward recognition as an independent country, while using the international political “force field” to keep Taiwan under house arrest under the “one China” roof.
China has been waiting for the return of a pro-China regime. It seeks to drag the international issue of Taiwan into the historical corner of the civil war between the KMT and the CCP, to be settled privately by Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
These choices are waiting for Taiwanese voters to show where they stand in January.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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