Former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), chairman and presidential candidate of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), stated the other day in a live stream interview that Taiwan would “take a downturn” if he is not elected president next year and that he found the living conditions for southern Taiwan’s young people appalling.
During a visit to southern Taiwan, Ko met a 35-year-old man who is making a monthly salary of about NT$40,000, he said. With a house rent of NT$5,000, the young man had intended to apply for rent subsidies, but was prevented from doing so by the landlord. Without a strong financial income, he is not yet planning to get married.
Ko did not follow up the question of annual salaries, which reveals his ignorance of the salary structure of the private sector. This is hardly a surprise, as Ko’s work history only included being a doctor at National Taiwan University and mayor of Taipei, both of which were fixed salary jobs without year-end bonuses or dividends. As a result, Ko would not be aware that the income of private-sector employees is not fixed, but could fluctuate due to year-end bonuses or dividends.
Ko thought he could ask a few questions and become Mr Know-it-all, only to find that he is flaunting his ignorance of social conditions. It is a matter of opinion whether a monthly salary of NT$40,000 and rent of NT$5,000 in southern Taiwan allows one to “scrape by” or “live comfortably.”
The ironic thing is, as the chairman of the TPP, Ko seems to be paying his own employees in Taipei at a failing rate.
A simple search on job Web sites reveals that the TPP is not setting an example and showering its employees with generosity either. For example, an organization development commissioner is offered NT$30,000 to NT$35,000 per month, assistant editor is paid a minimum of NT$30,000 and video editor a minimum of NT$32,000, while a TPP legislature policy research assistant is paid NT$30,000 to NT$40,000.
The point is, all jobs require employees to work from the TPP’s headquarters in Taipei’s Zhongzheng District (中正區), a district where renting a house for NT$5,000 would be impossible.
If Ko wishes to excoriate the governing party for making young people’s lives increasingly harder, he could start by offering more salary to his future employees to be based in a city with a higher quality of living.
From mayor to chairman, Ko’s Achilles’ heel has always been raising issues without offering any solutions. If the young man in question had difficulties in applying for subsidies, Ko, whose party holds multiple legislative seats, could be galvanized into proposing improvements to the rent subsidy program. Or he could help with collecting evidence and appealing to the Ministry of the Interior along with an legislative proposal to deter other landlords from making similar moves.
Ko only wishes to invoke feelings of discontent and exploitation among young people; yet he would not use his power to assist them. Instead, he offers low pay to his future employees.
Ko, who is all talk and no action, is the last person anyone can count on to “save” Taiwan, least of all young people.
Huang Wei-ping is a former think tank researcher and a Kaohsiung resident.
Translated by Rita Wang
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