When then-Italian prime minister Giuseppe Conte signed up for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2019, Italy became the only G7 country to become a BRI member. Then-White House National Security Council spokesman Garrett Marquis responded to the news by saying that Italy should not be legitimizing “China’s infrastructure vanity project.”
The BRI is no vanity project, and it is a dangerous mistake to underestimate it. While flawed, it is an audacious, innovative and effective mechanism for promoting Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) attempt to subvert the established international world order.
The BRI has been called the New Silk Road. It has also been dubbed “globalization with Chinese characteristics.” It consists of two railroad routes extending from China through Asia into Europe, one via Russia, Belarus and Poland, the other taking in Central Asia, Iran and Turkey. There is also a maritime route between China and the Mediterranean via the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal, as well as air freight routes between China and Europe. The BRI brings together 44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 35 in Europe and Central Asia, and 25 in East Asia and the Pacific region.
Essentially, the core concept of the BRI is to provide investment in infrastructure projects in participating countries to fabricate a sprawling trade and supply chain network that ostensibly benefits those countries, but ultimately consolidates centralized control of the entire network in Beijing.
Just as it is a mistake to disregard the scale and audacity of the BRI, it is a mistake to regard it as simply being about trade. More importantly, it is about enhancing China’s power and influence throughout the globe, not only by controlling the supply chains, and conjuring up trade and an export destination for China’s construction sector surplus capacity, but also by promoting loyalties among member countries and thereby providing an alternative to the US’ global influence and the narrative of how the world can most effectively be ordered.
Beijing recognizes that the US’ strength derives from its network of alliances. It wants to play the US at its own game, and must have been delighted at getting a G7 member EU country on board, because of the opportunity it presented to drive a wedge between Washington and the EU. Italy’s decision to join in 2019 was significant enough for Xi to make the trip to Rome and deliver a speech to mark the event.
However, Italy’s experience with the BRI has not been entirely positive. Chinese exports to Italy have soared, but there has only been a very modest increase in Italian exports to China since 2019.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has said that her government is considering withdrawing from the BRI, and that she would make a decision by December.
Washington would be happy if she removes the country from the initiative. This would not be because of the trade aspect; it would be because of the geopolitical implications of the withdrawal.
Meloni’s December deadline is part of the original agreement: Italy’s membership is due to automatically renew in March next year, unless Rome officially declares its intention to withdraw, at which time it can renegotiate the terms. Everything she has said before suggests she is serious about leaving.
In an interview published on Sunday in the Corriere della Sera newspaper, Italian Minister of Defense Guido Crosetto described Conte’s decision to join the BRI as “improvised and atrocious.” It is telling that it was the country’s defense minister making the comment.
Taipei would also be relieved if Meloni pulls Italy out: With all the progress made recently with internationalizing the Taiwan Strait issue and improving ties with EU countries, having Beijing controlling supply chains into the center of Europe is cause for concern.
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