China’s counter-espionage Law amended on Saturday last week and Foreign Investment Law enacted on Jan. 1 last year were designed to work together.
Article 4, Paragraph 3 of the Counter-Espionage Law gives a broad definition of acts of espionage, ie: “Activities carried out, instigated or funded by foreign institutions, organizations and individuals other than espionage organizations and their representatives, or in which domestic institutions, organizations or individuals collude, to steal, pry into, purchase or illegally provide state secrets, intelligence and other documents, data, materials or items related to national security, or in which state employees are incited, enticed, coerced or bought over to turn traitor.”
This definition provides law enforcement officials with greater administrative discretion and “free evaluation of evidence” to define virtually anyone as a spy if they want to. Anyone can become a spy in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) eyes at any time, even through perfectly innocent or innocuous activities such as conventional market research or travel photography.
This definition is similar to articles 34 and 35 of the Foreign Investment Law. Article 34 says: “The state shall establish a foreign investment information reporting system. Foreign investors or foreign-funded enterprises shall submit the investment information to competent departments for commerce through the enterprise registration system and the enterprise credit information publicity system.”
Article 35 adds: “The state shall establish a safety review system for foreign investment, under which the safety review shall be conducted for any foreign investment affecting or having the possibility to affect national security.”
Articles 34 and 35 provide the CCP with greater administrative discretion and room for interpretation to call anyone a “national security violator” if it wants. The lack of implementation regulations for the two articles would allow Beijing to force foreign investors to submit operational plans and business secrets to meet its requirements for security review.
The two acts share the characteristic of “Chinese rule of law” — articles without details about how they are to be implemented. This characteristic gives officials room for “power rent-seeking,” which is not only a breeding ground for corruption, but also a political leader’s tool to purge perceived enemies.
It is ordinary people and investors who will suffer in the end.
Taiwanese should take precautionary measures when coducting business or traveling in China to avoid unexpected jeopardy.
Yu Kung is a Taiwanese entrepreneur working in China.
Translated by Eddy Chang
KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) recent visit to Beijing and her upcoming visit to Washington will serve as a high-level test of her diplomatic mettle. In Beijing, Cheng was received with symbolic gestures, a warm reception, and high-level access. In Washington, she will receive far less pomp and far sharper questions about the KMT’s vision for the future of Taiwan. Her challenge will be to persuade Washington that the KMT’s engagement with China can coexist with strong deterrence. Cheng’s April 7-12 visit to mainland China coincided with an intense period of conflict in Iran. Despite the strategic significance of Cheng’s trip,
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has sent the vast Asian chemicals industry into a tailspin. Deprived of the likes of Qatari natural gas and Saudi Arabian oil, the region’s fertilizer and plastics plants are slowing production or even shutting down. Everywhere except China, that is. In petrochemicals, China is unique. As well as a traditional industry that uses oil and gas as feedstock, it has parallel output that relies on its abundant domestic coal. Unsurprisingly, India and other regional powers want to copy and paste the Chinese method. This would not be easy — or climate friendly. The
US President Donald Trump recently repeated his claim that “Taiwan stole America’s chip industry,” reigniting public debate on the issue. As a former Taiwanese minister of economic affairs and an entrepreneur deeply involved in semiconductor supply chain development, I feel a responsibility to clarify this misunderstanding. From the perspective of global industrial evolution and the economic principle of comparative advantage, such a statement appears overly simplistic and risks obscuring the essence of the issue. The rise of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry was not built on “replacing America,” but rather emerged as a result of countries pursuing different development paths within the
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto says he knows how to fix the problems facing Indonesia. Yet his economic mismanagement and authoritarian tendencies are steering the nation toward a familiar mix of currency instability and political chaos. The world’s fourth-most populous nation risks reversing the hard-won democratic and business reforms that came after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. At that time, the rupiah collapsed and the political upheaval that followed forced former president Haji Mohamed Suharto from power. Prabowo’s administration is ignoring similar warning signs. That disconnect was apparent in a national address on Wednesday, when Prabowo projected the swagger that has