The Sunflower movement in 2014 unleashed a political tidal wave that reshaped Taiwan’s political landscape. Led by student protesters, citizens started an anti-China movement across Taiwan, protesting against the signing of the cross-strait service trade agreement.
Taiwan People’s Party founder, Chairman and presidential candidate Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) is backtracking on his original stance on the signing of the agreement. He now says he was opposed to the lack of transparency of the negotiations rather than the agreement itself in 2014.
I was one of the student protesters. The goal of the protest was as much about the closed-door negotiations as it was about the content of the treaty, but the main aim was always to prevent China from using economic coercion against Taiwan and eventually achieving unification.
Earlier this year, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office spokeswoman Zhu Fenglian (朱鳳蓮) said that Beijing is “willing to restart cross-strait dialogue on the common political foundation of adhering to the ‘one China’ principle and the ‘1992 consensus.’” In other words, restarting cross-strait dialogue has to be conducted on the basis of the “1992 consensus” and acknowledging the “consensus” is to accept China’s “one country, two systems” Taiwan model.
Nearly a decade after the Sunflower movement, cross-strait relations have proven that not ratifying the agreement was the right thing to do. As Ko once said, the “‘1992 consensus’ is to kowtow and surrender to China,” and the agreement would lead to “high-end doctors leaving Taiwan for China.” Based on his previous discourse, it is apparent that Ko was against the agreement itself, aside from opposing its closed-door nature.
China’s use of coercive economic strategies to achieve political goals has become an increasing problem around the globe. Its Belt and Road Initiative created a lending spree, with Beijing issuing thousands of loans to more than 140 countries. In 2017, after struggling to cough up money to China, Sri Lanka signed over the rights to a strategic port to Beijing, as part of the so-called “debt trap diplomacy.”
As Taiwan is on the front line of China’s military threat, thinking that the agreement would only do good and no harm would be naive and play into China’s hands. If this is not a Trojan horse, then what is it?
Following the COVID-19 pandemic, foreign investors started moving their supply chains out of China as they have come to realize the extent of social instability under such an autocratic regime. The failure in planning the economy has also led to a sharp rise in youth unemployment. Compared with a decade ago, there would only be fewer advantages in seeking closer economic integration with China today.
There were always different voices in the Sunflower movement. Some were against the closed-door negotiations, some wanted to hamstring the agreement, while some were stymieing the then-ruling party’s subsequent efforts to liberalize trade with Beijing. What is certain that all the protesters were against China using economic coercion to achieve its political agenda.
After the movement, some of us went back to our lives, some joined civic groups, while others formed new political parties. The most famous example was none other than Ko, who became the Taipei mayor.
As a fellow ally in the movement, I respect people’s choices, but I would like to remind them what they once believed in and stood for: protecting Taiwan from China’s claws and doing the best for Taiwan.
I still remember the slogan in 2014, which was: “defend democracy, retract the cross-strait service trade agreement.”
Does that ring a bell, Mr Ko?
Pan Kuan was a participant in the 2014 Sunflower movement.
Translated by Rita Wang
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